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INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE
EXTRATERRITORIAL PROVISIONS OF
THE SHERMAN ACT: A JUDICIAL
RESPONSE BASED UPON THE
MUCH MALIGNED "EFFECTS" TEST
"In truth, few laws can escape the searching analysis of the judicial power
for any length of time .. "
-Alexis De Tocquevillet
I. INTRODUCTION
Extraterritoriality concerns the exercise of jurisdiction by United States
courts over activities occurring beyond its physical borders.2 In recent
years, extraterritorial application of legislation issued by the United States
Congress3 has triggered a retaliatory response by foreign governments4 as
1. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 75 (H. Reeve Text, F. Bowen & P.
Bradley revised, 1981).
2. Extraterritoriality implicates both subject matter and personal jurisdiction. See Note, Pre-
dictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L.
REv. 1310, 1310 n.2 (1985). This Comment will address the issues and problems related to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction assertions over foreign corporations under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
3. See, e-g., Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); Foreign Trade Antitrust Improve-
ments Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 6a (West Supp. 1990); Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982);
Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45(f) (1982); Money Laundering Control Act, 18
U.S.C. § 1956(f) (1982); FED. R. CIV. P. 4(e), (i).
4. See, eg., Foreign Antitrust Judgments Act, No. 13 (AusTL. 1979); Business Records Pro-
tection Act, ONT. REV. STAT. ch. 54 (1970); Protection of Trading Interests Act, 1980, ch. 11
(Great Britain).
For a detailed analysis of the British response to extraterritorial provisions in United States
antitrust laws, see Note, Antitrust: British Restrictions on Enforcement of Foreign Judgments, 21
HARV. INT'L L.J. 727 (1980). The Canadian response to such legislation is discussed in Com-
ment, The Canada-United States Memorandum of Understanding Regarding Application of Na-
tional Antitrust Law: New Guidelines for Resolution of Multinational Antitrust Enforcement
Disputes, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 1065 (1984-85). See also Griffin, Possible Resolutions of
International Disputes over Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 279,
279-82 (1982) (explanation of the various types of retaliatory statutes enacted in response to
United States extraterritorial antitrust provisions).
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well as a concern among businessmen and commentators about the effects
such legislation may have on the American economy.'
The application of United States extraterritorial legislation to foreign
corporations has its source in the antitrust laws.6 In 1909 the Supreme
Court held that United States antitrust laws could not reach conduct
outside of the United States. 7 Thirty-six years later, the Second Circuit
stated that United States courts could assert jurisdiction over foreign con-
duct under antitrust law where the conduct was intended to, and actually
did, affect the United States.' This famous "effects" standard was inter-
preted broadly by the courts and heralded a period of increasingly expan-
sive interpretation of the extraterritorial reach of United States antitrust
legislation.9 It was not until 1976 that a federal court departed from the
"effects" test regarding the extraterritorial reach of United States antitrust
laws.10
With this expanded view of extraterritorial reach under the Sherman
Act has come a proliferation of tests created by the courts to determine
whether, in a particular situation, subject matter jurisdiction can be main-
tained over a defendant. 1 In addition, tests have been formulated by Con-
5. See, eg., Schwecter & Schepard, The Effects of United States Antitrust Laws on the Inter-
national Operations of American Firms, I Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 492, 492-97 (1979); see also
Note, supra note 2, at 1320-22.
The greatest concern within the business community centers around the uncertainty of the
coverage and scope of the Sherman Act's extraterritorial provisions. See generally McCullough,
The Continuing Search for Greater Certainty: Suggestions for Improving U.S. and EEC Antitrust
Clearance Procedures, 6 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 803 (1984).
6. In particular the Sherman Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982); the Clayton Antitrust Act,
15 U.S.C. § 22 (1982); Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1982); the Webb-Pomer-
ene Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 61-65 (1982).
7. American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356-59 (1909).
8. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. ("Alcoa"), 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945) (on
certification and transfer from the Supreme Court for lack of a quorum of qualified justices).
9. See infra notes 94-139 and accompanying text; see also E. KINTNER & M. JOELSON, AN
INTERNATIONAL ANTrTRUST PRIMER 22-28 (1974) (discussion of impact of Alcoa on develop-
ment of interpretive judicial decision-making in the federal courts).
10. Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976). For a thorough
treatment of Timberlane and other cases employing so-called "balancing" tests of jurisdiction
under the Sherman Act, see infra notes 140-83 and accompanying text.
11. See Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 610-11, for a list of various "effects" test formulations; see
also In Porters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 497-500 (M.D.N.C. 1987).
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gress12 and the American Law Institute.13 The variety of jurisdictional tests
and interpretations under the extraterritorial provisions of United States
antitrust laws has contributed to a lack of predictability with respect to the
scope and reach of these statutes.14
First, this Comment will trace the development of extraterritorial sub-
ject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act through an analysis of case
law. This will provide an understanding of the problems associated with
the wide range of tests applied by the federal courts in determining jurisdic-
tion under the Sherman Act. Next, the viability of continued judicial efforts
to address the jurisdictional inquiry is presented. A call for the Supreme
Court to announce a uniform jurisdictional standard follows, along with a
discussion of the proper framework within which such a standard should be
constructed. This Comment concludes with an argument favoring a test
12. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 6a, 45(a) (1982).
The Act supplements Sherman Act jurisdictional provisions relating to export trade, stating that
such provisions apply only where alleged conduct has a "direct, substantial and reasonably fore-
seeable effect" on United States commerce.
Some commentators have minimized the importance of the Act because it does not apply to
United States import trade, which more frequently implicates foreign defendants. See, e.g.,
Schmidt, The Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Laws, 5 J.L. & COM. 321, 333-
35 (1985); Victor & Chou, United States Antitrust Jurisdiction Over Overseas Disputes After Title
IV of the 1982 Export Trading Company Act and Timberlane, 10 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1, 14-15
(1986).
Some courts have applied the Act's jurisdictional standard, but many have chosen to ignore it.
Compare Eurim-Pharm GmbH v. Pfizer, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984) (effects must be
direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable) with Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am.
(Timberlane I), 749 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1984) (applying balancing of interests test with no men-
tion of FTAIA standard).
13. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
§§ 402, 403. Section 402 of the Restatement provides for a "substantial effects" jurisdictional test.
Section 403 specifies that courts may choose to apply an abstention doctrine to determine whether
to assert jurisdiction in a particular case.
The use of such abstention doctrines has found some acceptance among the courts and com-
mentators. See, e.g., Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979);
Shenefield, Extraterritoriality and Antitrust - New Variations on a Familiar Theme, Remarks
before the International Law Institute and the ABA Section of International Law (Dec. 10, 1980),
reprinted in L.A. Daily J., Jan. 7, 1981, at 4, col. 3. However, more recent commentaries and
decisions have called into question the validity of the abstention doctrine in the Sherman Act
context. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984); Kadish, Comity and the International Application of the Sherman Act: Encouraging the
Courts to Enter the Political Arena, 4 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 130, 144-45 (1982).
14. Circuit Judge Weis, writing for the court in Mannington Mills, stated that "[n]either the
[Sherman] Act nor its legislative history gives any clear indication of the scope of the extraterrito-
rial jurisdiction conferred, leaving such determination to the courts." Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d
at 1291. See generally Kintner & Griffin, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Commerce Under the Sherman
Antitrust Act, 18 B.C. INDUS. & COM. L. REv. 199 (1977); Ongman, "Be No Longer a Chaos"
Constructing a Normative Theory of the Sherman Act's Extraterritorial Jurisdictional Scope, 71
Nw. U.L. REv. 733 (1977).
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based on "effects," rather than "balancing," in order to foster greater pre-
dictability in Sherman Act jurisdictional assertions.
II. TESTS OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
UNDER THE ANTITRUST LAWS
The first step in determining whether a particular court may assert juris-
diction over a specific defendant involves a consideration of whether the
court has subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute. Congress has granted
the federal courts exclusive general jurisdiction under both the Sherman15
and Clayton Acts. 6 The following material analyzes the courts' treatment
of subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act.
A. The Territoriality Test
The first case to consider the extraterritorial application of United
States antitrust law was American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. 7 In this
case, an Alabama corporation brought suit against a New Jersey corpora-
tion alleging the Costa Rican government, at the instigation of the defend-
ant, had seized plaintiff's banana plantation.' 8 The alleged conduct
occurred entirely outside of the United States. 9 Justice Holmes announced
that "the general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as
lawful or unlawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country
where the act is done."'2 Therefore, the Sherman Act could have no appli-
cation to conduct which occurred outside of the United States.2
15. 15 U.S.C. § 4 (1982).
16. 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1982).
17. 213 U.S. 347 (1909).
18. Id. at 354-55. After the seizure a Costa Rican court held an exparte hearing and declared
the plantation to be the property of a Costa Rican citizen.
19. Id. at 355. This appears to have been the controlling factor in Justice Holmes' decision.
20. Id. at 356. Justice Holmes also recognized the role of comity in the jurisdictional inquiry,
stating:
For another jurisdiction, if it should happen to lay hold of the actor, to treat him according
to its own notions rather than those of the place where he did the acts, not only would be
unjust, but would be an interference with the authority of another sovereign, contrary to
the comity of nations, which the other state concerned justly might resent.
Id. (emphasis added).
Today, a major battle rages among commentators, courts and foreign representatives concern-
ing the role comity should play in extraterritorial assertions of jurisdiction under the Sherman
Act. See, eg., Griffin, supra note 4, at 297-300; Kestenbaum, Antitrust's "Extraterritorial" Juris-
diction: A Progress Report on the Balancing of Interests Test, 18 STAN. J. INT'L L. 311, 315-19
(1982); Schmidt, supra note 12, at 330-33; Victor & Chou, supra note 12, at 6-9.
21. American Banana, 213 U.S. at 357. Justice Holmes did, however, recognize that in cer-
tain cases "immediately affecting national interests [a court may] ... make and.., execute...
threats as to acts done within another recognized jurisdiction." Id. at 356. Justice Holmes obvi-
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In the years following the American Banana decision, the United States
became increasingly involved in international commerce. This involvement
was accompanied by an expanded view of the extraterritorial potential of
the Sherman Act by the Supreme Court.22 The first sign of this changing
philosophy was manifest in United States v. Pacific & Arctic Railway & Nav-
igation Company,23 decided only four years after American Banana. In Pa-
cific Railway the United States alleged that Canadian and American
corporations had conspired to monopolize transportation routes between
the United States and various Alaskan and Canadian ports.24 The defend-
ants argued that American Banana precluded the Court from exercising
jurisdiction over a foreign corporation absent its consent.25 The Supreme
Court rejected this logic and without distinguishing American Banana,26
held that the Sherman Act authorized jurisdiction over the foreign defend-
ants with respect to those acts which occurred within the United States.2 7
The Court reasoned that jurisdiction cannot be defeated simply because one
ously felt that the conduct alleged did not constitute an "immediate effect" upon the United
States. This conclusion was perhaps "a reflection of the relatively limited role of the United States
in the world economy during the early twentieth century." Victor & Chou, supra note 12, at 3.
In addition, the American Banana decision can be seen as a parallel to domestic jurisdictional
pronouncements of the same era. See Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). "The authority of
every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the state in which it is estab-
lished." Id. at 720. Jurisdictional assertions based upon territory limits held sway until the deci-
sion in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945). Significantly, United States v.
Aluminum Co. of Am. ("Alcoa"), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945), which departed from the Ameri-
can Banana territorial standard, was decided the same year.
22. See Note, Extraterritorial Application of the Sherman Act to Foreign Corporations, 11
DEL. J. CORP. L. 513, 516-18 (1986).
23. 228 U.S. 87 (1913).
24. Id. at 101-03. While American Banana was a private antitrust suit brought by one corpo-
ration against another, Pacific Ry. represents a public antitrust suit brought by the United States
government. It was the first public suit to succeed on jurisdictional grounds over a foreign
defendant.
25. Id. at 100. Prior to International Shoe, consent was important to jurisdictional assertions
over conduct beyond the physical territory in which a particular court presided. Consent was not,
however, the sole determinative factor.
26. The Court could have distinguished American Banana from Pacific Ry. because in the
former case both parties were American, while in the latter, one party was American and one
party Canadian. In addition, all the conduct alleged in American Banana took place outside of
the United States, while some of the conduct in Pacific Ry. occurred within the United States.
Note, supra note 22, at 517 n.39.
27. Pacific Ry, 228 U.S. at 105-06. The Court recognized the need for the United States to
regulate its own commerce, regardless of the nationality of those who allegedly harm it. The
authority of Congress to regulate the United States economy is unquestioned. Addyston Pipe &
Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899). This authority is at the heart of the antitrust
policy of the United States. United States v. South-Eastern Underwriters Ass'n, 322 U.S. 533
(1944). Thus, courts should make their jurisdictional assessments recognizing this underlying
congressional authority. See infra notes 222-33 and accompanying text.
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of the defendants is foreign, when part of the alleged conduct affected the
United States. 28
The Court further eroded the American Banana test in Thomsen v.
Cayser.29 This private antitrust suit involved an alleged combination to
control shipping rates between New York City and South Africa.30 The
defendants combined to offer reduced prices to American firms who would
agree to ship their goods exclusively with the defendants,31 while firms that
refused, would pay a higher rate.3 2 The Court conceded that the actual
agreement was formed abroad by foreign entities, which would have ended
the analysis under American Banana.33 Nevertheless, Justice McKenna
held that the Court had subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act
because the alleged conspiracy was effectuated in New York City.34
In United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., the Supreme Court further lim-
ited American Banana, holding that it did not apply to a conspiracy
founded in the United States to monopolize the exportation of sisal from
Mexico.36 The complaint alleged that a Mexican firm and several Ameri-
can firms combined efforts to monopolize sisal trade.37 The Mexican de-
fendant apparently persuaded the Mexican government to enact
discriminatory legislation which favored its business. 38  Pursuant to this
28. Pacific Ry., 228 U.S. at 105-06. The notion that "effects" upon United States commerce
play a role in determining jurisdiction was first articulated in this case. It later became the stan-
dard jurisdictional test in Alcoa.
29. 243 U.S. 66 (1917).
30. Id. at 68-69.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. "[T]he general and almost universal rule is that the character of an act as lawful or un-
lawful must be determined wholly by the law of the country where the act is done." American
Banana, 213 U.S. at 356 (emphasis added).
34. Thomsen, 243 U.S. at 88. Justice McKenna stated that the defendant's conduct "affected
the foreign commerce of this country and was put into operation here." Id. The notion of "ef-
fects" as first articulated in Pacific Ry. thus became a true jurisdictional factor in Thomsen.
35. 274 U.S. 268 (1927).
36. Id. at 275-76. The Court effectively limited American Banana to its own facts, implying
that it would only proscribe jurisdiction in a case in which a "conspiracy... to do acts in another
jurisdiction ... permitted by local law" has no effect on United States commerce. Id. at 276
(quoting American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 359 (1909)).
37. Id. at 272.
38. Id. at 273. A foreign government's conduct, if of the type which apparently occurred in
this case, might now fall within the Act of State doctrine, thereby relieving the corporate defend-
ants of liability. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). These cases, however, recog-
nized that the separation of powers doctrine may preclude courts from sitting in judgment over
foreign sovereigns. See also Foreign Assistance Act, 22 U.S.C.A. § 2370(e)(2) (West 1973) (re-
stricting the discretion of courts to apply the Act of State doctrine, vesting such power in the
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legislation, defendants were able to control the entire sisal market in Mex-
ico and the United States.39 The Supreme Court held that jurisdiction was
satisfied because the alleged combination affected United States commerce
and some of the conduct occurred within the United States.4°
Thus, twenty years after American Banana, courts were imposing juris-
dictional power over foreign defendants whose activities were entered into
or given effect in the United States and whose activities had or were in-
tended to have a detrimental effect on American commerce. 41 Activities
conducted wholly outside the United States which affected United States
commerce were not within the jurisdictional scope of the Sherman Act.42
The need for the "presence" of the defendant, or its acts, in order for a
court to assert jurisdiction remained.
B. The Intended Effects Test
On the heels of Sisal Sales came the stock market crash of 1929, the
Great Depression, the New Deal and World War II. Emerging victorious
from the War, the United States quickly became a "dominant postwar
econom[y] with increasing commercial ties around the world. '43 This set
the stage for a revolutionary change in the jurisdictional thought of Ameri-
can courts.44
The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit had the first opportunity to
demonstrate this new jurisdictional vision in United States v. Aluminum
Company of America ("Alcoa"). 4  In Alcoa, a Canadian company com-
bined with several European producers of aluminum to control the amount
of aluminum sold in the United States, thus controlling prices.46 Their
agreements were formed outside of the United States.47 Judge Learned
Hand determined that a United States court would have jurisdiction over
executive branch); Kadish, supra note 13, at 136-38 (analysis of the judicial development of the
Act of State doctrine and congressional modifications of its use).
39. Sisal Sales, 274 U.S. at 273-74.
40. Id. at 276. Justice McReynolds stated that the defendants "by their own deliberate acts,
here and elsewhere... brought about forbidden results within the United States." Id. (emphasis
added). In this case, the court relied upon effects ("results") as a jurisdictional factor, and also
relied upon intent ("deliberate"). "Intended effects" became the jurisdictional standard in Alcoa.
41. Note, supra note 22, at 518.
42. See Note, Enforcement of United States Antitrust Laws Over Alien Corporations, 43 GEO.
L.J. 661, 661-62 (1955).
43. Victor & Chou, supra note 12, at 3.
44. Id.
45. 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
46. Id. at 439-41.
47. Id. The court of appeals could have decided the case under the rule espoused in Thomsen
where jurisdiction was predicated upon acts having been committed in part within the United
1990]
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the conduct of foreign corporations, where that conduct was intended to,
and actually did, affect United States commerce. 4  The Court based its
philosophical break from past cases on the notion that economic effects felt
within the United States are indistinguishable from conduct within our bor-
ders and should therefore be treated the same under our laws. 9
The Alcoa decision marked a significant overhaul of the extraterritorial
application of United States antitrust laws.-" The Alcoa test has essentially
two parts: intent and actual effects." The required intent is not specific,
but rather is "satisfied by the rule that a person is presumed to intend the
natural consequences of his actions." 52 The effects test is less broad, requir-
ing "actual effects" on United States commerce.5 3 Once intent to affect
United States commerce is demonstrated, the burden of proof shifts to the
defendants; 54 "in other words, a showing of intended effects constitute[s] a
prima facie showing of actual effects."55 The Alcoa decision can be seen as
an attempt to revamp extraterritorial application of antitrust laws to meet
the challenges and conflicts engendered by the increasing participation of
the United States in the burgeoning post-war economy.
1. Application of the Effects Test
Once the extraterritorial reach of the Sherman Act was established in
Alcoa, courts felt compelled to refine the broad test outlined by Judge Hand
to gauge the extent of the effects and the nature of intent necessary to in-
States. Under the Thomsen standard, jurisdiction could have been found in the United States. See
Thomsen, 243 U.S. at 88.
48. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44.
49. Id. at 444. The American Banana requirement, that conduct take place in the United
States before jurisdiction may be asserted, was now completely reversed, although American Ba-
nana itself had never been explicitly overruled.
A court, relying on Alcoa, presumably could exercise jurisdiction via the Sherman Act over
conduct anywhere in the world if such conduct was allegedly intended to and allegedly did effect
American commerce. Note, supra note 22, at 519.
50. Fortenberry, Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial Antitrust Violations - Paths Through the
Great Gimpen Mire, 32 OHIO ST. L.J. 519, 529 (1971).
51. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444. Judge Hand emphasized that both elements of the test must be
met before jurisdiction can attach.
52. D. FUGATE, FOREIGN COMMERCE AND THE ANTITRUST LAWS 48 (rev. ed. 1973). See
Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 431-32.
53. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444. Subsequent cases demonstrate an attempt by the federal courts to
define the scope and magnitude of effects required for jurisdictional assertions. See, e.g., In Por-
ters, S.A. v. Hanes Printables, Inc., 663 F. Supp. 494, 497-501 (M.D.N.C. 1987); Zenith Radio
Corp. v. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 494 F. Supp. 1161, 1187-89 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part
and rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir. 1983).
54. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
55. Victor & Chou, supra note 12, at 4 (citing United States v. Aluminium Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945)).
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voke subject matter jurisdiction.56 The refining, and in some instances re-
defining, of the Alcoa test created a wide disparity in interpretation among
the circuits, leading some courts to abandon the test altogether.57  This
problem has been heightened by the Supreme Court's refusal to hear cases
which might require it to construct a uniform definition to be applied by all
circuits.5 The following text provides a look at the development of law
under the "effects" test, a body of rules and tests so disparate that one com-
mentator has termed it a "Great Grimpen Mire' 5 9 and another has de-
scribed it as "somewhat confused."'
a. Intent Necessary for Jurisdiction to Attach
Courts have generally agreed that the intent necessary to assert subject
matter jurisdiction over a foreign defendant under the "effects" test is a
general intent rather than a specific intent.61 However, the Supreme Court
has announced that specific intent is required to prove criminal violations
under the Sherman Act.62 Confusion regarding the intent portion of the
"effects" test has arisen because some courts have eliminated intent com-
pletely from their jurisdictional analysis.63
56. Perhaps the courts sensed that while the Alcoa test allowed for potentially broad extrater-
ritorial Sherman Act jurisdictional reach, "reason dictate[d] that there must be sufficient contact
with the United States and the effects upon national commerce must be more than minimal"
before jurisdiction should attach. Schmidt, supra note 12, at 329.
57. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
58. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), va-
cated and remanded, 460 U.S. 1007 (1982), aff'd on rehearing, 704 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 961 (1983); Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981),
cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001 (1982); Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F.2d
92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972); Sabre
Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied,
407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied sub nom., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Sabre Shipping Corp., 395
U.S. 922 (1969).
The Court has affirmed the tests applied by other courts from time to time. See, e.g., Conti-
nental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co., 370 U.S. 690 (1962) (affirming use of intended
effects test); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951) (affirming standard
of direct and influencing effect on trade). However, the Court has avoided crafting a uniform test
of jurisdiction to be applied by all federal courts.
59. Fortenberry, supra note 50, at 519.
60. Griffin, Impact on Canada of the United States Antitrust Laws, 57 ANTIRusT L.J. 435,
437 (1988).
61. See, e.g., Zenith Radio Corp., 494 F. Supp. at 1184; Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v.
Distillers Co., 395 F. Supp. 221, 226-27 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
62. United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422, 435 (1978). The Court did
specifically approve the use of a general intent requirement in civil antitrust cases. Id. at 436 n.13.
63. See, eg., Sabre Shipping Corp., 285 F. Supp. 949.
1990]
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The "effects" test was utilized in United States v. General Electric Co. 64
An agreement between General Electric, through a subsidiary, and several
foreign corporations, which allocated the world market in incandescent
lamps, contained a specific provision excluding American commerce and
companies from its terms.65 Notwithstanding the contractual language, the
Court found the agreement affected United States commerce.16 Further,
the Court held that the foreign companies knew or should have known that
the agreement was part of the American company's plan to exclude foreign
competition in the United States market.
67
While the intent test applied in General Electric was not a strenuous
one, the court in Sabre Shipping Co. v. American President Lines, Ltd.,
failed to consider intent at all.6 In Sabre Shipping, the plaintiff alleged that
one Philippine and five Japanese companies had entered into an agreement
to monopolize the Hong Kong-United States and Japan-United States ship-
ping trade.69 The district court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction
over the foreign defendants because United States antitrust laws extend to
any conduct "which affects the trade and the commerce of the United
States. ' ' 70
In Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Distillers Co. ,71 intent was included in
the "effects" test. Two American companies brought suit against three for-
eign corporations alleging that the termination of an exclusive distributor-
ship agreement between the parties violated the Sherman Act.7" The court
first established that the defendant's conduct affected United States com-
merce.73 It then held that the required intent could "'be satisfied by the
rule that a person is presumed to intend the natural consequences of his
actions.' "I The reasoning behind the loose interpretation of intent as an-
64. 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949).
65. Id. at 887.
66. Id. at 891. The court found a "direct and substantial" effect on United States commerce.
67. Id. Intent to affect American commerce was imputed to the defendants not based upon
their subjective state of mind, but upon the very act of entering into the agreements.
68. 285 F. Supp. at 953.
69. Id. at 950.
70. Id. at 953 (citing United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (1945)).
71. 395 F. Supp. 221 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
72. Id. at 226. The American companies were exclusive distributors of the defendant's prod-
ucts in the United States. The complaint alleged that the defendants conspired to terminate the
distribution agreements without sufficient notice. Id.
73. Id. at 227.
74. Id. (quoting D. FUGATE, supra note 52, at 48). The idea implicit in General Elec., 82 F.
Supp. at 891, was verbalized in Fleischmann. This reading of intent requirements substantially
eased the plaintiff's burden in pressing an extraterritorial antitrust claim by allowing the trier of
fact to presume intent from the results. Kintner & Griffin, supra note 14, at 222.
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nounced in Fleischmann was explained in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Electric Industrial Co.75 The court interpreted the intent requirement from
Alcoa as general rather than specific, stating:
Judge Hand did not specify the degree of the effect nor the type of
intent required. In applying the rule to the facts at hand, however,
he implied that the intent required was of a general and not specific
nature, using words such as "expected" and "supposed" to describe
the [defendants'] state of mind.7 6
At first glance, this basic disagreement among the courts regarding in-
tent appears to be a rather serious problem. However, given the de mini-
mus standard of intent required by those courts who have employed it as
part of the "effects" test, the division seems less vital. Indeed the Sabre
Shipping court may have recognized this when it formulated its "effects
only" test. The Supreme Court has also given conflicting pronouncements
regarding the intent requirement of the "effects" test.77
Courts which have abandoned the "effects" test in favor of a balancing
of interests test also appear to have removed intent from their jurisdictional
analysis.78 These courts, however, may address questions of intent among
the several factors they list in their balancing tests.79 Courts which purport
to retain allegiance to the "effects" test must retain an intent requirement,
for, as Judge Hand warned:
There may be agreements made.., not intended to affect imports,
which do affect them, or which affect exports .... Yet when one
considers the international complications likely to arise from an ef-
fort in this country to treat such agreements as unlawful, it is safe to
assume that Congress certainly did not intend the Act to cover
them.8 0
Courts which ignore the intent requirements are apt to render decisions
which both anger foreign businesses and governments and embarrass the
United States.81 Congress has attempted to address problems of arbitrary
75. 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980).
76. Id. at 1184 (discussing Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444); see also Fleischmann, 395 F. Supp. at 226-
27.
77. Compare United States v. United States Gypsum Co., 438 U.S. 422 (1978) (specific intent
for criminal cases, general intent for civil cases) with Timken, 341 U.S. 593 (no mention of intent).
78. See, eg., Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98; Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614.
79. See, eg., Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98 (existence of intent to harm or affect
American commerce and its foreseeability); Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 614 (extent to which there is
explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce).
80. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
81. See, e.g., Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980)
(commonly referred to as In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.). While the court acknowledged that the
Alcoa test required both effects and intent, id. at 1253, it upheld a district court decision which
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court decisions under the Sherman Act by enacting the Foreign Trade Anti-
trust Improvements Act of 1982 (FTAIA).82 But as one commentator has
stated, the Act's " 'direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect test'
[may not differ] from the 'intended effects' test of Alcoa," in its treatment of
intent.83
b. Effects Necessary for Jurisdiction to Attach
While some problems have occurred as a result of different interpreta-
tions of the intent portion of the Alcoa test, a far greater concern has been
the disparity in analysis of the "effects" necessary to assert jurisdiction. 4
The General Electric case,85 discussed above, represents an early attempt to
refine the "effects" test. There the court held that a violation of the Sher-
man Act requires a "direct and substantial effect" on United States com-
merce. 86 The court reasoned, in light of Judge Hand's statement in Alcoa,
that "[w]e should not impute to Congress an intent to punish.., conduct
which has no consequences within the United States,"' 87 more than a trivial
effect must be shown. 88 The court then proceeded to apply a simple "ef-
fects" standard, asserting jurisdiction over Phillips Corporation "[e]ven
though there [was] no showing as to the extent of commerce restrained
"189
The District Court for the Southern District of New York next had
occasion to apply the "effects" test in United States v. Imperial Chemical
Industries.90 This case involved an alleged conspiracy among the defend-
had asserted jurisdiction without considering either intent or effects. Id. at 1255-56. For a discus-
sion of the stir created by the decision in Westinghouse, see Kestenbaum, supra note 20, at 319-26.
82. 15 U.S.C. §§ 6a, 45(a)(3) (1982). The Act mandates use of a jurisdictional test which
requires a finding of "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect[s]" before jurisdiction
may be asserted in cases affecting the export trade of the United States.
83. Schmidt, supra note 12, at 334-35. Both tests apply an intent standard based on the
reasonably foreseeable consequences of one's actions. See supra note 67 and accompanying text;
see also Kintner & Griffin, supra note 14, at 222.
84. See Kestenbaum, supra note 20, at 312-15; Schmidt, supra note 12, at 329-30; Victor &
Chou, supra note 12, at 5-6.
85. 82 F. Supp. 753.
86. Id. at 891.
87. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
88. General Elec, 82 F. Supp. at 891.
89. Id. This case is representative of a long line of decisions which have announced various
tests under the extraterritorial provisions of the Sherman Act, but have not necessarily applied the
test they announced. Such discrepancies led to confusion and eventually to the abandonment of
the "effects" test by some courts. See cases cited supra note 57. The "balancing" tests suffer from
the same shortcomings, although the problem is disguised under the auspices of judicial interpreti-
vism. See generally Kadish, supra note 13, at 156-62.
90. 100 F. Supp. 504 (S.D.N.Y. 1951).
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ants, three American corporations and one British corporation, to monopo-
lize world markets in the chemical products, sporting goods and
ammunitions industries. 91 This was accomplished through a series of price-
fixing agreements, assuring the conspirators' ability to eliminate head to
head competition by allocating markets to jointly held subsidiaries which
sold products at prices directed by the parent corporations.92 After a
lengthy discussion of the agreements between the defendants, the court con-
cluded that the agreements were "intended to affect the export and import
trade of the United States . . . [and] achiev[ed] the purpose and end for
which they were organized." 93
The first opportunity for the Supreme Court to construe the Alcoa test
came in Timken Roller Bearing Company v. United States.94 In this case, an
American corporation and its two European subsidiaries had entered into
agreements providing for a territorial division of world markets for antifric-
tion bearings.95 The United States alleged that such agreements were en-
tered into for the purpose of fixing prices, eliminating competition and
restricting both the import and export trade of the United States.96 The
District Court for the Northern District of Ohio asserted jurisdiction over
the European subsidiaries, 97 stating that "[tlhe contracts.., were intended
to and had the effect of eliminating competition."9' The district court
viewed the extent of the effects as "of no moment" under Sherman Act
considerations.99 Jurisdictional questions were not before the Supreme
91. Id. at 509. The division of markets was accomplished through the establishment of sev-
eral jointly owned subsidiaries operating in Europe and South America. These subsidiaries were
also parties to the unlawful agreement. Id.
92. Id. at 592.
93. Id. The court found extensive evidence to support the plaintiff's charge of anticompeti-
tive activities. While the evidence that the court found would have easily satisfied a "substantial
effects" test, the court instead chose to apply a simple "intended effects" test. Id.
Although, this decision appears to be in agreement with the Alcoa test of subject matter juris-
diction, there is a sharp disparity between the test applied in this case and that utilized in General
Electric. See supra notes 85-89. Therefore, six years after Alcoa, courts were in general disagree-
ment as to what the "effects" test meant.
94. 341 U.S. 593.
95. Id. at 595. The European defendants, British Timken, Ltd. and Societe Anonyme Fran-
caise Timken, were wholly owned subsidiaries of Timken Roller Bearing Co., an Ohio
corporation.
96. Id. at 595-96.
97. United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 83 F. Supp. 284 (N.D. Ohio 1949).
98. Id. at 307.
99. Id. As authority for this proposition, the court cited Associated Press v. United States,
326 U.S. 1 (1945) and United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150 (1940). Those cases
however, dealt with intrastate and interstate commerce, and in no way implicated foreign com-
merce or jurisdictional assertions over foreign defendants. The test employed by the district court
may be read to authorize jurisdiction upon a finding of any effect upon United States commerce.
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Court on appeal"°° and the Court upheld the district court without com-
menting on its "effect" test application.1"1 In Timken, the Supreme Court
did not seize the opportunity to comment upon the district court's "effects"
test, nor did the Justices venture to construct their own test.
The Federal District Court for the District of Columbia had occasion to
construe the "effects" test in In re Grand Jury Investigation of the Shipping
Industry. 12 Here, the Deputy Attorney General had directed that evidence
of possible offenses allegedly committed by firms operating in the ocean
shipping industry be presented to a grand jury in the District of Colum-
bia.103 Some of the allegations concerned price fixing agreements involving
carriers of United States cotton."° One hundred fifty corporations were
served with requests for documents to be used by the grand jury and fifty-
nine corporations filed motions to quash with the district court.105 The
court affirmed the subject matter jurisdiction of the grand jury, stating that
"the foreign commerce of this country is clearly considered to be 'af-
fected'" by the alleged conduct.10 6 Curiously, the court concluded that
"the facts and prior court decisions"10 7 favored the conclusion that the
grand jury should be "permitted to determine by inquiry whether ... the
agreements entered into by the shipping lines in the Cotton Trade [sic] do
have a 'substantial anticompetitive effect on our foreign commerce.' "loB By
Thus, while appearing to apply the Alcoa test, the district court fashioned a much broader stan-
dard, not heeding Judge Hand's warning about such overbroad tests. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443.
100. Appellants were permitted to appeal directly from the district court to the Supreme
Court under 15 U.S.C. § 29.
101. Timken, 341 U.S. at 600-01. The court has consistently avoided fashioning its own
Sherman Act jurisdictional standard.
102. 186 F. Supp. 298 (D.D.C. 1960).
103. Id. at 301.
104. Id. at 302. The bulk of the American cotton that was grown in the West was exported
from California and two Mexican ports, Ensenada and Guaymas. The United States claimed that
agreements entered into by various carriers that were operating out of these ports effectively pre-
vented new entrants from competing in the cotton export trade. The Justice Department claimed
that these agreements directly affected the cotton export trade and indirectly affected domestic
cotton prices. Id. at 302-03.
105. Id. at 301-02.
106. Id. at 313.
107. Id. at 314 (citing United States v. Timken Roller Bearing Co., 341 U.S. 593 (1951));
United States v. National Lead Co., 332 U.S. 319 (1947); United States v. Sisal Sales Corp., 274
U.S. 268 (1927); United States v. Pacific & Arctic R.R. & Navigation Co., 228 U.S. 87 (1913);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
108. Shipping Investigation, 186 F. Supp. at 314 (citing Report of the Attorney General's
Nat'l Committee to study the Antitrust Laws of March 31, 1955, pp. 76-77).
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annunciating two potentially disparate "effects" tests, the district court fur-
ther contributed to the interpretive refining of the Alcoa test."0 9
The opinion of the Federal District Court for the Southern District of
New York in United States v. The Watchmakers of Switzerland Information
Center, Ltd. "' vividly portrays the broad license courts were employing in
applying the effects of the test. In Swiss Watchmakers, the United States
alleged that several Swiss and American corporations had conspired to re-
strict American watch production, restrict exports and imports of watches
and parts, and fix prices for watches and parts in the United States.11 Sev-
eral of the Swiss defendants contested the subject matter jurisdiction of the
district court.' 1 2
The court, in its conclusions of law, found that the conspiracy "substan-
tially affected United States trade and commerce." '113 Later in its conclu-
sions, the court stated that the defendant's agreements "[had] operated as a
direct and substantial restraint" on United States commerce. 114 The court
posited that it could entertain jurisdiction over "acts and contracts abroad
if... such acts and contracts have a substantial and material effect upon
our foreign and domestic commerce."' 15 The court, in describing the re-
straints effectuated by the combinations, stated that the defendant's conduct
109. It is unclear whether the court, in citing Alcoa, was announcing Judge Hand's "intended
effects" test, whether the court was trying to interpret what Alcoa must have meant, or whether
the court was formulating its own standard. The Attorney General's report seems to have
adopted a "substantial effects" test similar to that announced in General Elec., 82 F. Supp. at 891.
110. 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) 70,600 at 77,414 (1962).
111. Id. at 77,416.
112. Id. at 77,417. In addition, several defendants sought to escape liability by invoking vari-
ous formulations of the Act of State, Sovereign Compulsion and Sovereign Immunities doctrines.
Id. at 77,456-57.
113. Id. at 77,455. The court also determined that the defendants intended their actions to
have such effects on American commerce. Id.
114. Id. at 77,456. Such conduct was held to have passed the jurisdictional standard, even
though some of the defendants were foreign nationals, some of the agreements were entered into
in foreign countries and some of the alleged conduct was lawful in the country in which it took
place. Id.
115. Id. at 77,457. This test appears to be repetitive since both "substantial" and "material"
may refer to the extent of effects on commerce. However, "material" can also refer to relatedness
of effects. One would be hard pressed to find conduct which has a substantial but immaterial
effect on commerce. It is not as difficult to imagine conduct which is related yet insubstantial.
Similarly, conduct could possibly have substantial effects on the United States, yet be unrelated to
commerce.
The court's test can thus be seen as either a two-part standard, based on intent and substantial
or material effects (if substantial and material both refer to extent of effects), or a three-part test,
based upon intent, substantiality of effects (substantial refers to extent of effects) and materiality of
effects (where material refers to relatedness of effects). The difficulty in determining which stan-
dard the court intended to apply shows the problems which arise when courts carelessly modify
the language from a test annunciated in prior cases.
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"obviously had a crippling effect" in the United States.' 16 The court con-
cluded that "[t]he only question suggested here is whether the acts of the
defendants have affected United States trade and commerce and, if so,
whether they have restrained [it]. ' ' 117 Thus, the court announced five differ-
ent "effects" test formulations in its opinion.
The federal courts have been equally disparate in their jurisdictional "ef-
fects" test formulations in private Sherman Act suits. In Occidental Petro-
leum Corp. v. Buttes Gas and Oil Co., 11 the district court refused to dismiss
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, stating that a "substantial and an-
ticompetitive effect of American commerce" is not required under the juris-
dictional provisions of the Sherman Act. 1 9 The correct test to apply is
whether there is "some effect on our foreign commerce ... , 120 The court
adopted the view that "any effect that is not both insubstantial and indirect
will support federal jurisdiction ... ."121
In Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 22 the district
court held that restraints imposed by the defendant upon its wholesalers,
116. Id. This statement is only dicta, but it represents yet another layer of verbiage which
future courts may choose to incorporate into a holding.
117. Id. In this instance the court appears to have adopted the "intended effects" test from
Alcoa. Upon closer inspection, however, this is not entirely evident because the court indicates
that effects must be of sufficient strength to restrain commerce. Under the Sherman Act "restraint
of trade" is the standard necessary for proof of a violation. This court has brought the proof of
violation standard into the jurisdictional inquiry. It would be absurd to require that proof of a
violation be proven before jurisdiction will be asserted. Therefore, the court could not have meant
what it said. See Occidental Petroleum Corp. 331 F. Supp. at 102 (warning against confusing
proof of violation standard with jurisdictional standard in Sherman Act cases).
The problem in this court's analysis is in the verbal structure of its holding. Such technical
criticisms of the court's language are offered to conceptualize the way in which a verbally simplis-
tic test, such as "intended effects," can be modified, refined and verbally abused until its meaning
is manifestly unclear and hence, unworkable.
118. 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972). A private anti-
trust suit is one brought by a business entity, such as a corporation, against another such entity.
Such suits are brought to recover monetary damages and/or to obtain injunctive relief. Public
antitrust suits are brought against business entities by the United States government, as a function
of the government's regulatory power over the economy. Such suits may constitute criminal pros-
ecutions punishable by fines and injunctions.
119. Id. at 102; see supra note 117. See also Beausang, The Extraterritorial Jurisdiction of the
Sherman Act, 70 DICK. L. REv. 187, 191 (1966). "An 'affect' [sic] is a necessary element of
jurisdiction in Alcoa situations; a direct and substantial 'affect' [sic] is necessary for Sherman Act
violations. The problem arises when the standards of illegality ... are confused with the jurisdic-
tional feature of the 'affect [sic] on foreign commerce.'" Id.
120. Occidental Petroleum, 331 F. Supp. at 102. As authority for its "some effects" test, the
court cited the Sherman Act itself, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1982).
121. Occidental Petroleum, 331 F. Supp. at 103 (citing I J. VON KALINOWSKI, ANTITRUST
AND TRADE REGULATION § 5.502[2], at 5-121-22).
122. 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
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which restricted the number of distributors of its beer in the Bahamas, "di-
rectly affected the flow of commerce out of the [United States]." 123 Thus,
Sherman Act jurisdiction was found, even though the "ultimate result of
the restraint imposed ... [was] the elimination of competition in the Ba-
hama Islands." '124 The court rationalized that the impact of the defendant's
activities was restraint of American trade with the Bahamas.125
The foregoing discussion illustrates that federal courts have inconsis-
tently and often incorrectly applied the "effects" test. Courts have chosen
to modify Judge Hand's Alcoa language in an effort to define its potentially
broad scope but have simply made the test more confusing. One commen-
tator summed up the unsuccessful attempt by the federal courts to refine the
Alcoa "effects test," saying:
[A]lthough it has been abundantly plain since the Alcoa case that
trade practices which have unlawful consequences in the United
States are not immune from its antitrust laws merely because the
actions which brought about those consequences took place outside
the territorial limits of this nation, in application there has been wide
disparity in the case law as to the substantiality of the effects on
American commerce required before jurisdiction may be asserted. 126
The stage was therefore set for a philosophical change in Sherman Act ju-
risdictional jurisprudence.
C. The Balancing Tests
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit was the first court to aban-
don the "effects" test in Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America.1 27 In
Timberlane, the plaintiff alleged that American and Honduran officers of
the defendant bank conspired to prevent the plaintiff from exporting lumber
to the United States.128 The court discussed the "effects" test at length,
concluding that it was "incomplete because it fail[ed] to consider other na-
tion's interests... [or] the full nature of the relationship between the actors
123. Id. at 587.
124. Id.; see also Industria Siciliana Asfalti, Bitumi, S.p.A. v. Exxon Research and Eng'g Co.,
1977-1 Trade Cas. (CCH) % 61,256 at 70,775 (1977).
125. Todhunter-Mitchell, 383 F. Supp. at 587. This decision represents a particularly broad
jurisdictional assertion because there was no evidence that any United States markets were af-
fected by the alleged conduct. The antitrust policy enforcement interest of the United States is at
its weakest ebb when conduct alleged does not impact United States markets. See infra notes 294-
95. It is not clear whether the "effects" test was designed to cover such activities. See Alcoa, 148
F.2d at 443-44.
126. Schmidt, supra note 12, at 330.
127. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
128. Id. at 601.
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and this country."1 29 Instead, the court proposed a balancing of interests
test130 grounded upon three questions:
1. Does the alleged restraint affect, or was it intended to affect, the
foreign commerce of the United States?
2. Is it of such a type and magnitude so as to be cognizable as a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act?
3. As a matter of international comity and fairness, should the extra-
territorial jurisdiction of the U.S. be asserted to cover it?13 1
Part one of the "balancing" test echoes the familiar language of the Al-
coa test but is subject to a far broader reading than the "effects" test out-
lined by Judge Hand. Taken alone, part one of the Timberlane test could be
passed upon a finding of either intent or effects on United States com-
merce.' 32 The second part of the test appears to address the questions of
whether the effect on commerce is direct or indirect'3 3 and whether it is
substantial or de minimus. 1 3 4
129. Id. at 611-12. Judge Choy argued that adding terms such as "substantial" to the "ef-
fects" test may have played some role in addressing the interests of foreign entities. He believed,
however, that the proper place for such language was in interstate antitrust suits rather than
extraterritorial suits, since such terms "ha[ve] a meaning in the interstate antitrust context which
does not encompass all the factors relevant to the foreign trade case." Id. at 612.
130. Id. at 613. The balancing tests are often referred to as "jurisdictional rule of reason"
tests, a phrase coined by Kingman Brewster. See K. BREWSTER, ANTITRUST AND BUSINESS
ABROAD 446 (1958). This term is potentially confusing because it defines the well-known "rule of
reason" doctrine in the interstate antitrust context. See, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. United States,
221 U.S. 1 (1911). Professor Brewster recognized that his "jurisdictional rule of reason" test bore
little doctrinal resemblance to that announced in Standard Oil, stating that the components of the
jurisdictional rule of reason are "a response to essentially political, rather than economic and
business considerations." K. BREWSTER, supra at 446. For a thorough discussion of conflicts
between the "rule of reason" doctrine and the "jurisdictional rule of reason" standard, see Kadish,
supra note 13, at 154-56.
131. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 615.
132. Because the Timberlane "balancing" test announces an extremely broad "effects or in-
tent" element, Parts Two and Three of the test act to restrict Part One. Part One may authorize
jurisdiction where there is an intent to affect American commerce but no actual effect. While
some courts have dropped the intent requirement (see Sabre Shipping, 285 F. Supp. at 953-57), no
court has found jurisdiction absent some effect on United States commerce.
133. Presumably, this distinction would allow courts to refuse to entertain jurisdiction where
the alleged effects fall upon foreign markets and the effect on the United States falls not upon its
markets, but upon certain business interests. Such a test may operate to preclude a court from
exercising jurisdiction in a case such as Todhunter-Mitchell where the effects fell upon Bahamian
markets and upon a United States business trying to compete in those markets.
134. Concerns relating to the extent of the effects upon commerce should not be addressed at
the jurisdictional stage, but at the proof of violation stage. See supra note 117.
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-Part three of the Timberlane "balancing" test marks a clear departure
from Alcoa and its progeny.'35 The reviewing court is required to consider
the doctrine of comity 136 through the analysis of seven factors designed to
weigh the interests of the United States, foreign nations and defendants
against the magnitude of the alleged restraints as evidenced in parts one and
two of the test.137 While many commentators have criticized this part
135. Judge Choy noted that courts which employed the "effects" test had "often displayed a
regard for comity and the prerogatives of other nations and considered their interests .... "
Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 612. If this is the case, then Judge Choy's assertion that the "effects" test
is incapable of addressing the interests of other nations is flawed. See id. The true problem is not
with the "effects" test itself, but rather with the court's wide array of interpretations of its
meaning.
136. Comity has been defined as "courtesy; complaisance; respect; a willingness to grant priv-
ilege, not as a matter of right, but out of deference and good will." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
242 (5th ed. 1979). The doctrine of comity has no specific rules and its principles have been
likened to "an amorphous never-never land whose borders are marked by fuzzy lines of politics,
courtesy and good faith." Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads.- An Intersection
Between Public and Private International Law, 76 AM. J. INT'L L. 280, 281 (1982). For these
reasons, many courts and commentators feel that courts are incapable of applying the doctrine in
Sherman Act cases. See, eg., Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines 731 F.2d
909 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Kadish, supra note 38, at 142-44.
137. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-14. The seven factors advanced in Timberlane are:
1. The degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. The nationality or allegiance of the parties and the locations or principle places of business
of corporations;
3. The extent to which enforcement by either state can be expected to achieve compliance;
4. The relative significance of effects on the United States as compared with those elsewhere;
5. The extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm or affect American commerce;
6. The foreseeability of such effect;
7. The relative importance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States as
compared with conduct abroad.
Id. at 614. The court relied on tests created by the American Law Institute and by Professor
Brewster.
The American Law Institute tests provide that a court should consider such factors as:
(a) Vital national interests of each of the states,
(b) The extent and nature of the hardship that inconsistent enforcement actions would
impose upon the person,
(c) The extent to which the required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other
state,
(d) The nationality of the person, and
(e) The extent to which enforcement by action of either state can reasonably be expected
to achieve compliance with the rule prescribed by that state.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF THE FOREIGN RELATIONS LAWS OF THE UNITED STATES § 40
(1965).
Kingman Brewster suggested the following list of factors:
(a) [Tihe relative significance to the violations charged of conduct within the United States
as compared with conduct abroad; (b) the extent to which there is explicit purpose to harm
or affect American consumers or Americans' business opportunities; (c) the relative seri-
ousness of effects on the United States compared with those abroad; (d) the nationality or
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of the Timberlane inquiry, 138 several courts have adopted the test. 139
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit adopted its own balancing
test in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.1" A United States man-
ufacturer of vinyl floor covering brought suit against another United States
manufacturer, alleging that the defendant had secured foreign patents by
means of fraudulent representations to various foreign patent offices.1 41
The court framed its jurisdictional inquiry in the form of two questions:
1. Does subject matter jurisdiction exist?
2. If jurisdiction does exist, should it be exercised? 42
The first question is to be answered by means of the "effects" test. 143 If
effects are demonstrated, the court, guided by a set of factors designed to
balance United States and foreign interests, should determine whether to
exercise subject matter jurisdiction.'"
allegiance of the parties or in the case of business associations, their corporate location, and
the fairness of applying our law to them; (e) the degree of conflict with foreign laws and
policies, and (f) the extent to which conflict can be avoided without serious impairment of
the interests of the United States or the foreign country.
K. BREWSTER, supra note 130, at 446.
138. See, e.g., Griffin, supra note 4, at 294; Kadish, supra note 13, at 139-71; Note, supra note
2, at 1312 n.l1; but see Schmidt, supra note 12, at 330-31.
139. See, e.g., United States v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 740 F.2d 817 (11th Cir. 1984), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 1106 (1985); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 699 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983);
Montreal Trading, Ltd. v. Amax, Inc., 661 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1001
(1982); Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
140. 595 F.2d 1287.
141. Id. at 1290.
142. Id. at 1294. The court stated that where both litigants are Americans contesting alleged
antitrust activity abroad, resulting in harm to the export business of one of them, a federal court
always has subject matter jurisdiction. Id. at 1292.
143. Id. at 1291-92. The court cited both the original "intended effects" test from Alcoa and
a "substantial effects" test from Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280 (1952).
144. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98. The factors to be considered in the 'balancing
test' include:
1. Degree of conflict with foreign law or policy;
2. Nationality of the parties;
3. Relative importance of the alleged violation of conduct here compared to that
abroad;
4. Availability of a remedy abroad and the pendency of litigation there;
5. Existence of intent to harm or affect American commerce and its foreseeability;
6. Possible effect upon foreign relations if the court exercises jurisdiction and grants
relief;
7. If relief is granted, whether a party will be placed in the position of being forced to
perform an act illegal in either country or be under conflicting requirements by both
countries;
8. Whether the court can make its order effective;
9. Whether an order for relief would be acceptable in this country if made by the foreign
nation under similar circumstances;
THE MALIGNED "EFFECTS" TEST
At first glance, the tests employed in Mannington Mills and Timberlane
appear to be quite similar. There is, however, a significant underlying dif-
ference between the tests. In Timberlane, the "balancing" factors were uti-
lized in order to determine whether subject matter jurisdiction existed. 45
In Mannington Mills, the balancing factors were utilized to determine
whether subject matter jurisdiction should be exercised.'46 Thus, the
Timberlane approach seeks to replace the "effects" test with a more com-
prehensive jurisdictional inquiry. 147 The Mannington Mills test essentially
retains the "effects" test as a means of determining jurisdictional power, but
then employs a balancing test to inquire whether the court should abstain
from exercising jurisdiction. There are two resulting problems with this
abstention test.
In the first instance there is no recognized abstention doctrine to fit a
Sherman Act jurisdictional inquiry.1 48 Attempts to infer such a doctrine
from the Alcoa case are misguided.1 49  It is generally agreed that where a
court has jurisdiction to hear a claim it must exercise that power.150 There-
fore, unless the Supreme Court adopts an abstention doctrine akin to that in
Mannington Mills, the Third Circuit decision ought not be followed by
other circuits.1 5'
The second concern raised by Timberlane relates to the effect of the
abstention doctrine in international Sherman Act cases. Traditional absten-
10. Whether a treaty with the affected nations has addressed the issue.
Id.
145. Id. at 1301 n.9 (Adams, J., concurring). Judge Adams believed that the Timberlane
court had applied its balancing tests to the jurisdictional inquiry. He therefore criticized the Man-
nington Mills majority for having used its balancing tests as an abstention standard. Id. See also
Kadish, supra note 13, at 145-47 (disagreement as to whether Timberlane announced an expanded
jurisdictional test or an abstention doctrine).
146. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1294. See also Schmidt, supra note 12, at 331-32.
147. Part one of the Timberlane test reflects an "effects" inquiry. Parts two and three expand
the jurisdictional examination to consider the substantiality of effects and the interests of the
parties.
148. See M. REDISH, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: TENSIONS IN THE ALLOCATION OF JUDI-
CIAL POWER 233 (1980) (the common factor shared by most federal abstention doctrines is the
presence of an uncertain state law issue).
149. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. Judge Hand was setting limits on the "effects" test rather than
adopting an abstention doctrine when he stated that "[courts] should not impute to Congress an
intent to punish all whom [American] courts can catch ... for conduct which has no conse-
quences within the United States." Id. The last part of the statement refers to a lack of effects,
and does not refer to a situation in which effects are found. The court, nonetheless, abstains from
asserting jurisdiction as could occur under the Mannington Mills approach.
150. See, e.g., Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1301 n.9 (Adams, J., concurring); McClellan v.
Carland, 217 U.S. 268 (1910); Cahens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).




tion doctrine forces a litigant to bring his action in another forum, or to get
an authoritative interpretation of the law in another forum, prior to adjudi-
cating in the chosen forum.'52 The practical effect of Sherman Act absten-
tion is to deprive the plaintiff of any adjudication of his claim.'53 Such a
result implicates a denial of constitutional due process because a plaintiff
may be without redress for a wrong done him. 54
While the balancing tests in Timberlane and Mannington Mills were
heralded with much enthusiasm, many courts and commentators have since
rejected their application to Sherman Act jurisdictional analysis.' Cur-
rently the circuits are split, some following Alcoa,'56 others adopting the
"balancing" approach,157 and one apparently unwilling to commit to either
test.158
III. SHERMAN ACT EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN THE 1980S
The federal district courts are in general disagreement as to the jurisdic-
tional reach of the Sherman Act, as well as the proper test to apply to deter-
mine such reach. Each circuit has developed its own body of law regarding
subject matter jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. The result is a serious
lack of uniformity and predictability with regard to the extraterritorial as-
pects of the Sherman Act.
The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit apparently adopted an "ef-
fects" test in Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. 159
This dispute revolved around whether antitrust claims brought by a dealer
could be arbitrated as a counterclaim against a breach of contract suit
brought by a manufacturer."6 The court, in dicta, indicated that United
States antitrust laws "normally apply to any claim of monopolization or
152. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 145.
153. Id. The action is dismissed, leaving the plaintiff with no alternate forum despite the fact
that the plaintiff may have demonstrated actual effects upon United States commerce.
154. U.S. CONST. amend. V, § 3. Such tests may also run afoul of intended United States
antitrust law protections. See infra notes 224-33.
155. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 949; Westinghouse, 617 F.2d at 1255; Sandage,
Forum Non Conveniens and the Extraterritorial Application of United States Antitrust Law, 94
YALE L.J. 1693, 1701-02 (1985).
156. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 949; National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card
Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981), interpreted in Bulk Oil (Zug) A.G. v. Sun Co., 583 F. Supp. 1134
(S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd mern., 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984) cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984).
157. Mitsui, 671 F.2d at 876; Montreal Trading, 661 F.2d at 864.
158. Westinghouse, 617 F.2d at 1248.
159. 723 F.2d 155 (1st Cir. 1983).
160. Id. at 157.
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restraint of trade," '161 but held that extraterritorial application requires an
effect on American commerce.1 62
The Second Circuit has been guided in part by National Bank of Can-
ada v. Interbank Card Association.1 63 In this case the court of appeals held
that "the [jurisdictional] inquiry should be directed primarily toward
whether the challenged restraint has, or is intended to have, any anticompe-
titive effect upon United States commerce .... "164 This version of an "ef-
fects" test was followed in Papst Motoren GMbH & Co. KG v. Kanematsu-
Goshu,165 and in Bulk Oil (ZUG) A.G. v. Sun Co.. 166
Other district courts in the Second Circuit have opted for an "effects"
test based upon the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1982.
Thus, in Eurim-Pharm GMbH v. Pfizer, Inc.,16 7 and Liamuiga Tours v.
Travel Impressions, Ltd.,16 8 Sherman Act jurisdiction was predicated upon
a "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effect" on commerce. 169
Reliance on the provisions of the FTAIA may not always be proper since
the Act only applies to export trade activities.170 Furthermore, the legisla-
tive history of the Act demonstrates that its drafters may have seen no sub-
stantive difference between the "direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable" test and the "anticompetitive effects" test.1 71
Third Circuit courts have generally followed the lead of Mannington
Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp.,1 72 applying a two-part test based on effects
and comity. However, in Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita Electric Indus-
161. Id. at 167.
162. Id. Curiously, the court cited as authority for its holding both Alcoa and the Foreign
Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, despite their different tests for subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
163. 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981).
164. Id. at 8. The court criticized the Timberlane test, finding that it could lead to assertions
of jurisdiction "whenever the challenged conduct is shown to have some effect on American for-
eign commerce, even though the... anticompetitive effect is felt only within the foreign market."
Id. Some "effects" test formulations are susceptible to the same overbreadth. See Todhunter-
Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
165. 629 F. Supp. 864, 868 (S.D.N.Y. 1986).
166. 583 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd mem, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984).
167. 593 F. Supp. 1102 (S.D.N.Y. 1984).
168. 617 F. Supp. 920 (E.D.N.Y. 1985).
169. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15 U.S.C. § 6a(1) (1982).
170. See Victor & Chou, supra note 12, at 14.
171. Accord National Bank of Canada, 666 F.2d at 8 (2d Cir. 1981); see H.R. Rep. No. 686,
97th Cong., 2d Sess. (1982), reprinted in 1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWs 2487, 2492; see
also Victor & Chou, supra note 12, at 14 ("[T]o serve as the predicate for antitrust jurisdiction the
domestic effect must be an anticompetitive effect prohibited by the antitrust laws.").
172. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
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trial Co., 17 3 the District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
chose to frame the test into three parts:
1. intent to affect United States commerce;
2. some actual effect on that commerce; and
3. factors relevant to balancing the ten comity factors outlined in
Mannington Mills.1 74
Using its three-part test, the court denied summary judgment in favor of
several foreign defendants, 175 holding that the facts alleged demonstrated
an intended effect on American commerce. 176 The court of appeals affirmed
the district court's denial of summary judgment to several of the foreign
defendants.1 77 In doing so, it interpreted Mannington Mills as having an-
nounced an "intended effects" test and specifically stated that the circuit
had adopted the Alcoa test.178
In the Fifth Circuit, both the traditional "effects" test and the
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America 179 version of the "balancing"
test appear to have been advanced in Industrial Investment Development
Corp. v. Mitsui & Co. '80 The court of appeals there overturned a district
court's grant of summary judgment in favor of a Japanese corporation and
173. 494 F. Supp. 1161 (E.D. Pa. 1980), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, 723 F.2d 319 (3d Cir.
1983).
174. Id. at 1189. The district court noted that the substantiality of effects and intent were
considered as part of the balancing test. Id. at 1189 n.66. Apparently the court of appeals dis-
agreed, reviewing Matsushita in In re Japanese Elec. Prod., 723 F.2d 238, 306 (3d Cir. 1983)
(implying that Part One of the Mannington Mills test stood for simple "effects" standard).
175. Matsushita, 494 F. Supp. at 1189. The court found that the record before it supported
an assertion of jurisdiction but refrained from exercising it because questions remained as to which
of the defendants had participated in the alleged conspiracy. Id.
176. Id. The court did not consider any of the balancing factors it had endorsed and resolved
only the "purely legal" aspects of the jurisdictional inquiry. In this way the court demonstrated
that it viewed effects and comity as two separate tests, granting summary judgment based on
effects alone. Id.
177. In re Japanese Elec. Prod., 723 F.2d at 314-15.
178. Id. at 306. The court of appeals believed that the test of jurisdiction was "intended
effects" and that the "balancing" tests from Mannington Mills were quite separate from the juris-
dictional analysis. Confusion exists because the district court felt that the substantiality of both
intent and effects could be considered within the balancing test. Matsushita, 494 F. Supp. at 1189
n.66.
If the balancing tests are separate from the jurisdictional inquiry, then they cannot play a role
in determining the substantiality of effects or intent necessary to invoke the court's jurisdiction.
This is the view espoused by the court of appeals in In re Japanese Elec. Prod., 723 F.2d at 314-15.
See also Conservation Council v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 518 F. Supp. 270, 275-76 (W.D. Pa.
1981) (Mannington Mills failed to address substantiality of effects necessary to assert jurisdiction).
179. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
180. 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982), vacated, 460 U.S. 1007 (1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 961
(1983).
THE MALIGNED "EFFECTS" TEST
its American subsidiary.' 81 The court first propounded the "direct or sub-
stantial effects" test as the proper determinant of Sherman Act jurisdic-
tion. 182 It then proceeded to apply a simple "effects" test, finding that the
conduct alleged by plaintiffs could invoke Sherman Act jurisdiction.18 3 The
court also considered the Timberlane balancing factors, concluding that
"[a] district court should not apply the antitrust laws to foreign conduct or
foreign actors if such application would violate principles of comity, con-
flicts of law, or international law." '184 The court explicitly stated that such
balancing factors were not tests of subject matter jurisdiction but failed to
explain why it chose to include them in its jurisdictional analysis.18 5
The Seventh Circuit announced a jurisdictional test of "intended ef-
fects" in Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd.186 A cartel, initi-
ated by Australia, Canada, France and South Africa in response to a United
States embargo on uranium imports, sought to stabilize the uranium market
by setting minimum prices and allocating non-United States sales between
the members.1 7 Westinghouse, an American corporation, brought suit
against several corporations operating within the cartel, alleging anticompe-
titive price fixing agreements.18 The court of appeals initially identified a
two-pronged jurisdictional inquiry:
1. Does subject matter jurisdiction exist?
2. If so, should it be exercised? 189
As to the first question, whether jurisdiction exists, the court applied the
"intended effects" standard.19 0 Turning to the second question, whether
181. Id. at 885.
182. Id. at 883. The court cited United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. ("Alcoa"), 148 F.2d
416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945), as authority, yet Alcoa contains no such language.
183. Mitsui, 671 F.2d at 883.
184. Id. at 884.
185. Id. at 884 n.7. See also Rohm & Haas Co. v. Dawson Chem. Co., 557 F. Supp. 739, 832
(S.D. Tex. 1983), rev'd, 722 F.2d 1556 (1983), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 851 (1984) (citing Mitsui, 671
F.2d at 884, for the proposition that abstention doctrines, while valid, are not part of the jurisdic-
tional analysis).
186. 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
187. Id. at 1254.
188. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., No. 76-C-3830 (N.D. Ill. filed Oct. 15,
1976). The district court entered default judgment in favor of Westinghouse. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 473 F. Supp. 382 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The counterclaims of several defend-
ants against Westinghouse were not dismissed summarily. Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Rio Al-
gom Ltd., 473 F. Supp. 393 (N.D. Ill. 1979). The defendants then appealed the default judgment
entered by the district court. Westinghouse Electric Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th
Cir. 1980) (commonly refered to as In re Uranium Antitrust Litig.).
189. Westinghouse, 617 F.2d at 1253.
190. Id. at 1254. Controversy has centered around whether the court was correct in finding
intentional conduct on the part of the defendants. See Kestenbaum, supra note 20, at 320 n.48.
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abstention was proper, the court refused to adopt either the Timberlane or
Mannington Mills balancing tests. 191 Instead, the court affirmed the district
court's three-part abstention test, which considered:
1. The complexity of the present multi-national and multi-party
action;
2. The seriousness of the charges asserted; and
3. The recalcitrant attitude of the defaulters. 192
The court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in refusing to abstain from hearing the action, largely due to the refusal of
the defendants to appear. 193
The Timberlane balancing test was originally adopted by the courts of
the Ninth Circuit. Decisions following Timberlane struggled, however, in
actually applying the test. 194 In addition, courts questioned whether
Timberlane had in fact created a new jurisdictional test, or whether it had
simply attached an abstention test to the standard "effects" test. 195
This confusion led the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit to aban-
don Timberlane in McGlinchy v. Shell Chemical Co..196 In McGlinchy, the
plaintiff alleged that defendants had conspired on several fronts to eliminate
plaintiff's products from the market in order to monopolize production and
sales.197 Defendants alleged that plaintiff's claims related exclusively to
foreign commerce and thus were beyond the reach of the Sherman Act as
amended by the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA).198
The court of appeals acknowledged that the tripartite test announced in
Timberlane had been the governing test of subject matter jurisdiction under
extraterritorial Sherman Act cases, but indicated that a Timberlane analysis
was precluded by the FTAIA and proceeded to analyze the alleged activi-
191. Westinghouse, 617 F.2d at 1254-56.
192. Id. at 1255. The court rested its refusal to adopt the Mannington Mills or Timberlane
tests upon the fact that in the case before it the defendants had never appeared to defend. The
court was particularly upset that the defendant's governments had filed amicus briefs on their
behalf. Id. at 1256. The court's stern language was met with indignation from foreign observers
and apologies from the United States government. See Kestenbaum, supra note 20, at 322-23.
193. Westinghouse, 617 F.2d at 1256.
194. See, e.g., Star-Kist Foods, Inc. v. P.J. Rhodes & Co., 769 F.2d 1393, 1396 (9th Cir.
1985); Vespa of Am. Corp. v. Bajaj Auto Ltd., 550 F. Supp. 224, 228-30 (N.D. Cal. 1982). Both
cases deal with alleged violations of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125, 1127 (1982). The
Timberlane balancing test was specifically applied to Lanham Act cases in Wells Fargo & Co. v.
Wells Fargo Express Co., 556 F.2d 406 (9th Cir. 1977).
195. Vespa, 550 F. Supp. at 226-27 n.2.
196. 845 F.2d 802 (9th Cir. 1988).
197. Id. at 812.
198. Id. at 813. The court may have interpreted the coverage of the Act too broadly. See
supra note 171; see also Victor & Chou, supra note 12, at 14.
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ties under the "direct, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects" test.1 99
While the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under the FTAIA test, it noted that the Act did not
preclude courts from considering "principles of international comity" in
cases where the effects test was met.'c °
In Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines,2"1 the Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia had occasion to thoroughly analyze cur-
rent Sherman Act jurisdictional theories. In response to an antitrust suit
brought by Laker Airways in the United States, several British defendants
sought injunctive relief in the British courts to forbid Laker Airways from
prosecuting its claims.2"2 Temporary and permanent injunctions were en-
tered directing Laker Airways to dismiss its actions.2"3 Laker Airways
sought injunctive relief in the District Court for the District of Columbia to
prevent remaining foreign defendants from taking similar action.2" The
district court granted injunctive relief to Laker Airways in order to preserve
its own jurisdiction to hear the case.205 The defendants appealed.
In an insightful opinion by Judge Wilkey, the court of appeals affirmed
the district court's issuance of an injunction against the foreign defend-
ants.20 6 Judge Wilkey observed that both the United States and Britain had
a legitimate basis for entertaining jurisdiction.20 7 He recognized that it was
proper to address principles of comity2 "8 but rejected the recent "balancing
of interests" test as an implausible means to analyze such concerns. 20 9 In-
199. McGlinchy, 845 F.2d at 814.
200. Id. at 813 n.8. Thus, the court recognized that the Timberlane "comity" standard was
separate from the "effects" test, because replacing the "effects" test would not preclude considera-
tion of the "comity" test. Therefore, the court was still advocating an abstention doctrine in
Sherman Act cases.
201. 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
202. Id. at 915.
203. Id. The British defendants obtained an interim injunction from the High Court of Jus-
tice of the United Kingdom. That court later changed its view as to whether it should have issued
the injunction, but in the meantime, defendants had received a permanent injunction from the
British Court of Appeal.
204. Id.
205. Laker Airways, Ltd. v. Pan Am. World Airlines, 577 F. Supp. 348, 354-55 (D.D.C.
1983).
206. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 909.
207. Id. at 925-26. American jurisdiction was premised upon alleged effects upon commerce.
British jurisdiction was based upon the nationality of the parties.
208. Id. at 937. Judge Wilkey described comity as "serv[ing] our international system like
the mortar which cements together a brick house [and is a] necessary outgrowth of our interna-
tional system of politically independent, socio-economically interdependent nation states." Id.
Cf. Maier, supra note 136, at 281.
209. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 948-51. Judge Wilkey identified three weaknesses in the
"balancing" approach. First, the factors listed in the tests provide no avenue of conflict resolu-
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stead, Judge Wilkey applied a "substantial effects" test to Laker Airway's
antitrust allegations.21° Finding ample evidence of effects on United States
commerce, he determined that principles of comity should not be invoked
to defeat jurisdiction, since United States courts had a duty to protect im-
portant American interests.2"
The Laker Airways decision can be seen as construing an "effects and
interests" standard of Sherman Act jurisdiction. If actual effects on Ameri-
can commerce are alleged, the court will examine what interests are thereby
affected. If the interests are substantial, comity will not be invoked to quash
jurisdiction. This test varies from the "balancing of interest" tests in two
fundamental ways: 1) the court will not attempt to analyze foreign interests
or foreign policy concerns, and 2) the application of principles of comity is
within judicial discretion and need not be considered, balanced with other
interests, or applied in every case.
Subsequent cases in the District of Columbia circuit affirmed that Laker
Airways embraced an "effects" test 212 and rejected the "balancing of inter-
ests" approach.21 3 However, it is unclear whether Judge Wilkey's "inter-
ests" analysis need be employed in all extraterritorial Sherman Act cases, or
only in those cases in which more than one nation professes to have
jurisdiction.21 4
IV. Is A JUDICIAL SOLUTION POSSIBLE?
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, extraterritorial application of the
Sherman Act is in a state of confusion. Courts have refined the "intended
effects" test to such an extent, and in such variation, that they have com-
pletely lost sight of its meaning. Some courts have applied an "effects" test
tion. Second, the factors lead courts into the realm of political questions. Third, such tests re-
quire courts to balance the relative interests of nations, which is something that they are
unequipped to do. Id.
Judge Wilkey further argued that when courts attempt to balance the interests of competing
nations, they will typically enforce the interests of the nation under which they sit. Id. at 950-51.
"A pragmatic assessment of those decisions adopting an interest balancing approach indicate none
where United States jurisdiction was declined when there was more than a de minimus United
States interest." Id.
210. Id. at 925. While the court applied a test of "substantial effects," it hints that "direct
efforts" may also be required. Id. at 922.
211. Id. at 956. These interests include: 1) those of American transatlantic air travelers; 2)
creditors of Laker Airways (Laker Airways was in liquidation); and 3) the United States govern-
ment's interest in regulating conduct of business within its borders. Id.
212. See In re Sealed Case, 832 F.2d 1268, 1274 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
213. See Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 n.2 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
214. See American Horse Protection Ass'n v. Lyng, 690 F. Supp. 40, 44 (D.D.C. 1988).
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with no intent requirement.215 Other courts have grafted tests of Sherman
Act violation onto their jurisdictional inquiries.216 Recently, courts have
turned away from "effects" tests and have crafted "balancing of interests"
tests.217 Many courts have already rejected these tests.2"'
Congress, responding to the concerns of American business, the threat
of retaliatory legislation from other nations and the inability of the courts to
endorse a consistent jurisdictional policy, amended the Sherman Act in
1982. The Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act requires that "di-
rect, substantial and reasonably foreseeable effects" be present for a court to
entertain jurisdiction over foreign defendants.219 The FTAIA applies only
to the export commerce of the United States, essentially focusing on "ef-
fects" on American business interests outside of our country rather than on
"effects" within United States markets.220 Thus, the FTAIA does little to
resolve conflicts involving suits against foreign defendants by American
corporations which allege "effects" on United States commercial markets.
In addition, the FTAIA suffers from the same shortcomings as do cases
which confuse the tests of Sherman Act violation and Sherman Act jurisdic-
tional reach.221 All things considered, the FTAIA is an inadequate re-
sponse to the Sherman Act's extraterritorial difficulties.
Until Congress acts further, it will be up to the federal courts to define a
predictable Sherman Act jurisdictional policy. As we have seen, however,
the courts are prone to devise disparate tests of Sherman Act jurisdiction
when left to their own devices. Therefore, a prerequisite to any successful
judicial attempt to formulate a more cogent Sherman Act jurisdictional pol-
icy must be a definitive statement by the Supreme Court.
215. See Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949, 953-54
(S.D.N.Y. 1968), cert. denied, 407 F.2d 173 (2d Cir. 1969), cert denied, 395 U.S. 922 (1969).
216. See, e.g., United States v. General Elee. Co., 82 F. Supp. 753 (D.N.J. 1949); but see
Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92 (C.D. Cal. 1971), aff'd, 461
F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972) (warning courts not to confuse juris-
dictional test with proof of violation test).
217. See, e.g., Industrial Inv. Dev. Corp. v. Mitsui & Co., 671 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1982);
Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979); Timberlane Lumber
Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
218. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v.Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984); National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6 (2d Cir. 1981); Westing-
house Elec. Corp. v. Rio Algom Ltd., 617 F.2d 1248 (7th Cir. 1980).
219. 15 U.S.C. § 6a (1982). See supra note 155.
220. See Victor & Chou, supra note 12, at 14.
221. See supra notes 117, 134.
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V. THE NEED FOR A UNIFORM TEST OF JURISDICTION
A. The Supreme Court Must Act
The Supreme Court has not constructed a Sherman Act jurisdictional
standard since it endorsed the "effects" test in Continental Ore Co. v. Union
Carbide and Carbon Co.222 By failing to adopt a particular test, the Court
has only contributed to the malaise rather than playing its mandated role as
arbiter of conflicts in federal law interpretation.223 The division among the
federal judicial circuits is of great proportion. Traditionally, when the fed-
eral courts have applied law in a conflicting manner, the Supreme Court has
identified the proper interpretation. It should accept the challenge to do so
in this instance as well.
B. Threshhold Questions
In determining the proper jurisdictional standard under the Sherman
Act, the Court should address three fundamental questions:
1. What is the antitrust policy of the United States?
2. Who are the antitrust laws designed to protect?
3. What jurisdictional standards best reflect the concerns raised in
questions one and two?
Addressing these questions will allow the Court to announce a jurisdic-
tional standard which reflects United States antitrust goals and policy
rather than a test which itself attempts to define such policy.224
The first question is broad, yet fathoming the true purpose behind the
antitrust legislation will necessarily narrow the focus of any jurisdictional
test because it will expose areas beyond the intended reach of the statutes.
Determining the antitrust policy of the United States involves an analysis of
statutory language and congressional intent. The language of Section One
of the Sherman Act declares contracts and combinations, including trusts
222. 370 U.S. 690 (1962).
223. U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
Former Chief Justice Vinson stated, "[The] function of the Supreme Court is... to resolve
conflicts of opinions on federal questions that have arisen among lower courts ....... J.
SCHMIDHAUSER, THE SUPREME COURT: ITS POLITICS, PERSONALITIES AND PROCEDURES 132
(1960), reprinted in J. GROSSMAN & R. WELLS, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLI-
CYMAKING 39 (3d ed. 1988).
224. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600 (1941) (courts should not engage in
policy-making in antitrust cases). In fairness to the courts, a lack of specificity in the jurisdic-
tional tests under the Sherman Act, which engendered much concern and criticism among foreign
governments and American commentators, supra notes 4-5, may have led courts to employ the
highly interpretive "balancing" tests.
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and conspiracies, in restraint of trade or commerce, as illegal.2 25 The Act
unquestionably seeks to punish those who disrupt the free flow of the mar-
ket economy. 226 Congress explicitly included foreign commerce within an-
titrust coverage, but the courts interpreted this language as limited by
precepts of international law and comity.227 Therefore, it can be seen that
the United States antitrust policy is intended to have broad application to
regulate both foreign and domestic commerce.
The second consideration to address is to whom the antitrust protec-
tions are directed. In their broadest sense, antitrust laws are intended to
protect and preserve free markets.228 As a consequence, such laws also pro-
tect consumers and creditors who operate within markets.229 In addition,
such laws protect competition within markets.230 In one sense, the laws
also protect the victims of antitrust damages, hence providing for damages
in private suits. 23 1 The antitrust laws are also designed to protect the fed-
eral government's right to regulate commerce.232 In general then, it can be
said that United States antitrust statutes are "comprehensive... protecting
all who are made victims of the forbidden practices, by whomever they may
be perpetrated."
233
The foregoing discussion illustrates that a court must approach a juris-
dictional inquiry within the Sherman Act arena with an awareness of the
fundamental importance of antitrust legislation to our economic and social
system. Any extraterritorial Sherman Act jurisdictional test must reflect a
judicial commitment to preserve Congress' intent to protect our markets,
businesses and citizens from anticompetitive practices, whatever their
225. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
226. See, e.g., Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469 (1940); Tondas v. Amateur Hockey
Ass'n of United States, 438 F. Supp. 310 (W.D.N.Y. 1977); but see French Quarter Apartments,
Ltd. v. Georgia Pac. Corp. 655 F.2d 627 (5th Cir. 1981), cert granted, 456 U.S. 971 (1982), cert.
dismissed, 462 U.S. 1125 (1983). (Courts have interpreted the Act to punish unreasonable
restraints).
227. See, e.g., Mannington Mills v. Congoleum Corp., 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976); Pacific Seafarers, Inc. v.
Pacific Far East Line, Inc., 404 F.2d 804 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1093 (1969);
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. ("Alcoa"), 148 F.2d 416 (2d Cir. 1945).
228. See, eg., United States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973) (primary purpose of antitrust laws is to protect markets).
229. See, eg., Allied Elec. Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 369 F. Supp. 133 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
230. See, e.g., El Cid, Ltd. v. New Jersey Zinc Co., 551 F. Supp. 626 (S.D.N.Y. 1982) and 575
F. Supp. 1513 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd mem., 770 F.2d 157 (1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1021
(1985).
231. See, e.g., Radovich v. National Football League, 352 U.S. 445 (1957).
232. See, e.g., Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909 (D.C. Cir.
1984).
233. Mandeville Island Farms, Ltd. v. American Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 236 (1948).
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source. The question then becomes which, if any, of the jurisdictional tests
already announced can accommodate such a requirement.
C. The Balancing of Interests Tests
Several courts still favor the use of "balancing" tests to determine Sher-
man Act jurisdiction. However, such tests suffer from procedural and sub-
stantive weaknesses which render them unworkable.
1. Jurisdictional Test or Abstention Doctrine
It is manifestly unclear whether the balancing tests announce new juris-
dictional standards or simply attach abstention provisions to various "ef-
fects" tests. Either interpretation leads to significant problems. If the
"balancing" test is to be taken as a whole (all parts refer to an expanded
jurisdictional inquiry), the test is substantively incorrect. If the test is to be
split (one jurisdictional element and one abstention element), it becomes
procedurally misguided.
a. Balancing Tests As Jurisdictional Inquiries
An interpretation of the "balancing" tests as expanded jurisdictional
standards leads courts to factor Sherman Act violation tests into their juris-
dictional inquiries.234 In application, this leads courts into the same trap
that the refining of the "effects" test created.235 When courts employ such
adjectives as "substantial" or "direct" in the "effects" test, the result is that
plaintiff's allegations of effects on American commerce are heightened to
the level of proof of a Sherman Act violation.236 To require that a plaintiff
allege facts sufficient to constitute a Sherman Act violation for the court to
entertain jurisdiction is both substantively and procedurally improper.237
b. Balancing Tests Favoring Judicial Abstention
There is no recognized authority for judicial abstention under the Sher-
man Act.2 38 Therefore, an interpretation of "balancing" tests which allows
for judicial abstention, though the necessary effects are present, cannot be
234. See supra note 130 and accompanying text.
235. See supra notes 117, 119.
236. Id.; see also B. HAWK, UNITED STATES, COMMON MARKET AND INTERNATIONAL AN-
TITRUST: A COMPARATIVE GUIDE 42 (1979).
237. Procedurally, such tests confuse burden of production standards with burden of proof
standards. Substantively, such tests make it difficult for plaintiffs to allege sufficient facts at such
an early stage of the proceedings, thus usurping the antitrust protections implicit in the Sherman
Act. See supra note 229 and accompanying text.
238. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 148-55.
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procedurally correct. Once a court finds the necessary factors to invoke
jurisdiction, it must hear a case.239 Cases which recognize the Act of State
or Sovereign Compulsion doctrines do so at the jurisdictional stage, usually
determining that the defendant is not amenable because his acts are not his
own but those of a sovereign."4 Those courts do not find that jurisdiction
can be asserted over the defendant and then choose not to do so. Rather,
they find that no jurisdiction can be asserted. 41
The test in Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. 42 is often
viewed as an abstention standard because its two-part inquiry specifies that
once jurisdiction is determined, the court must decide whether it should be
asserted.23 Not only does such a standard violate procedural Sherman Act
norms, but its impact is heavier on plaintiffs than under other abstention
doctrines. In traditional abstention cases, the plaintiff is forced only to se-
lect a new forum, typically in a state court.2' Under a Mannington Mills
abstention case, the plaintiff is foreclosed from any further action in United
States courts since he is already in federal court.2 4  While such foreclosure
questionably violates constitutional due process, it clearly runs afoul of con-
gressional purposes under the Sherman Act. 46
2. Comity and Political Questions Doctrine
The balancing of interests tests encourage courts to enter the realm of
international relations and politics, where they have little experience and
less expertise. Substantively, this may allow Sherman Act claims to rest
upon the political relations between the United States and the defendant's
country rather than upon a consideration of the plaintiff's claim.247 Surely
such tests cannot square with United States antitrust policy interests.
239. See Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 927.
240. See, e.g., Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682 (1976) (Act
of State); Interamerican Ref. Corp. v. Texas Maracaibo, Inc., 307 F. Supp. 1291 (D. Del. 1970)
(Sovereign Compulsion).
241. This is especially true in the Act of State cases decided subsequent to the Foreign Assist-
ance Act, 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2)(1982), which reduced the court's jurisdictional power. See 4-
fred Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 697 (White, J., plurality opinion).
242. 595 F.2d 1287 (3d Cir. 1979).
243. Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1294. See Schmidt, supra note 12, at 331-32.
244. See supra note 152 and accompanying text.
245. See supra note 153.
246. See supra note 233; see also Pfizer, Inc. v. India, 434 U.S. 308, 314 (1978) (antitrust laws
are designed, ultimately, to protect American consumers).
247. See, e.g., International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. OPEC, 649 F.2d
1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (court refused to assert jurisdiction over OPEC defendants because of polit-
ical relationships between defendants and the United States). For a thorough discussion of the
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When a court undertakes the balancing of competing national interests
as required by Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of America24 and Man-
nington Mills, it risks intrusion upon the limits of justiciability of political
questions as determined by the Supreme Court in Baker v. Car. 249 By re-
quiring courts to consider such factors as the relative importance of the
alleged conduct to the United States as compared to the defendant's nation
and the extent to which enforcement by either country would be effec-
tive,250 the "balancing" tests clearly place courts within the political
realm.251 A court cannot be expected to ascertain the relative importance
to another country of its assertion of jurisdiction. Furthermore, the execu-
tive and legislative branches of the federal government, and not the judici-
ary, are empowered to determine the extent of United States interests under
legislative acts.252
Aside from political problems, the comity analysis inherent in "balanc-
ing" tests engenders practical difficulties. Courts are created under national
constitutions and statutes to preside over competing domestic interests.
When a court is faced with adjudication of a dispute between its own coun-
try and another, it will normally uphold the interest of its own country.2 53
Thus, the comity analysis breaks down in cases in which more than one
nation purports to have jurisdiction.254 Finally, United States courts should
apply the law and policy of the United States in a way that reflects congres-
sional and executive intent. The "balancing" test comity provisions usurp
such application by forcing the courts to consider the interests of other sov-
ereigns and thus, are unworkable.255 While comity may indeed play an im-
portant role in multinational litigation, it should be addressed by the
legislative and executive branches rather than the courts.25 6
OPEC case, see Kestenbaum, supra note 20, at 326-31. It is perhaps noteworthy that Judge Choy,
author of the Timberlane opinion, also delivered the opinion in OPEC.
248. 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1976).
249. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). But see Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486 (1969) (suggesting
courts may not always view political questions as non-justiciable).
250. See Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1297-98; Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613-14.
251. See supra note 207 and accompanying text.
252. Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 948-51. Judge Wilkey emphasized that "fj]udges are not
politicians. The courts are not organs of political compromise." Id. at 953.
253. Id. at 951.
254. See, e.g., id.
255. Id. at 948-49; see also Kadish, supra note 13, at 156-62 (balancing tests are confusing to
courts because interests of other nations are not self-evident and courts are not equipped to un-
cover them).
256. Congress has attempted to respond to international concerns relating to American asser-
tions of jurisdiction under the Sherman Act. See Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act, 15
U.S.C. § 6a (1982). Whether the Act was successful in addressing these concerns is questionable.
See supra notes 217-19 and accompanying text.
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3. The Uncertain Application of Balancing Tests
A final weakness of the "balancing" approach is its lack of precision.
On the surface, "balancing" tests appear more precise than "effects" tests
because of their increased verbiage. In truth, this makes them even more
vague because courts are given no direction as to how to apply the tests. 257
As a result, these tests are susceptible to disparate application. In the first
instance, courts are given no instruction as to how much weight to give
each factor.25 8 Similarly, they are not given guidance as to how to balance
the interests.2 9 Finally, the tests fail to recognize that the interests re-
quired to be balanced are not always cognizable.2e
The result of this lack of precision is the uncertain application of the
tests. The Timberlane court noted as much and in fact favored this re-
sult.261 However, because protection is an important factor in the applica-
tion of United States antitrust law, both victims and potential violators need
some certainty in order to understand where their actions stand under the
law.
VI. RESURRECTING THE EFFECTS TEST
It is apparent that the "balancing" tests fail to adequately further the
antitrust goals of the United States. The much maligned "effects" test can,
however, further these goals if applied with verbal integrity and if defined in
economic rather than legal or political terms.
A. Effects Tests Further U.S. Antitrust Policy
The "effects" test limits courts to consideration of allegations of Ameri-
can antitrust law violations and their requisite impact on American com-
merce.262 The focus of the "effects" test is upon the activity and the alleged
impact as opposed to the actors involved.263 Thus, the "effects" test re-
quires courts to construe United States antitrust policy rather than the poli-
257. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 140.
258. Id.; see also Griffin, supra note 4, at 294 (endorsing suggestion that Justice Department
promulgate "comity guidelines" to give courts direction in weighing balancing factors).
259. There is no indication as to how many factors, or which factors, need favor abstention
before jurisdictional authority should be refused.
260. See Kadish, supra note 13, at 140-41.
261. Timberlane, 549 F.2d at 613.
262. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. ("Alcoa"), 148 F.2d 416, 444 (2d Cir. 1945).
263. See supra note 243. But see, International Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v.
OPEC, 649 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1981) (the fact that the defendants were members of a group
(OPEC) upon which the United States was potentially dependent may have been the determina-
tive factor in the OPEC case).
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cies and interests of other nations, which properly rests with the legislative
and executive branches. 2 4 The test furthers United States antitrust policy
without granting courts license to comment upon or limit such policy.2 65
Therefore, the "effects" test requires that courts simply apply the law rather
than create it.
B. Effects Tests Further Congress' Market Protections
Since the "effects" test allows for no doctrines of abstention, it assures
those who operate within United States markets of protection against activi-
ties which restrain competition.266 Courts have and must exert subject mat-
ter jurisdiction under the "effects" test whenever alleged conduct impacts
upon American commerce. This indirectly furthers Congress' implied in-
tent to protect consumers and ensures that the United States' interest in
regulating its own markets is unimpeded.267
C. Which Effects Test?
Several forms of the "effects" test are currently in use. In order to be
fair, effective and workable, one test of "effects" must be accepted by all
federal courts. A single "effects" standard for Sherman Act extraterritorial
subject matter jurisdiction will further two indispensable antitrust policy
needs: uniformity and predictability in scope and application.265
1. Courts Verbal Abuse of the "Effects" Test
Since Learned Hand announced the "intended effects" test of subject
matter jurisdiction, courts have continually refined the test in an effort to
curb its perceived overbreadth. Courts have used descriptive language to
264. See Laker Airways Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World Airlines, 731 F.2d 909, 949 (D.C. Cir.
1984) (courts are not equipped to balance inherently political interests); see also Griffin, supra note
4, at 294 (embarrassing results may occur where courts go beyond their area of expertise in inter-
national litigation).
265. See United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 606 (1941).
266. Since there is no abstention option, a plaintiff who can allege intent and effects will be
entitled to the opportunity to prove antitrust damages.
267. See, eg., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d at 924; Harold Friedman, Inc. v. Thorofare Markets,
Inc., 587 F.2d 127, 135 (3d Cir. 1978).
268. In one sense, uniformity will render any jurisdictional test more predictable. However,
if a uniform test which suffers from potentially disparate application is advanced, predictability is
not furthered. Uniformity can be accomplished by a definitive Supreme Court statement. Pre-
dictability requires that the standard annunciated be "susceptible of consistent application ... 
Note, supra note 2, at 1321.
Predictability is vital to assertions of jurisdiction in the international antitrust context in two
ways: to enable multinational businesses to assess the cost of doing business in the United States,
and to engender a feeling among foreign nations that our antitrust policy is fair. See id.
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modify "effects" without considering the corrosive impact of such language
on the original and perceived meaning of the test.269 The result has been
either abandonment of the test or continued application without clear un-
derstanding of its intended coverage.
The original test focused upon the conduct alleged and its resultant im-
pact upon United States commerce.270 Subsequent courts required "direct"
or "substantial" effects on commerce before entertaining jurisdiction over
foreign defendants.2' These courts sought to limit the potentially broad
scope of a simple "effects" test, but what they accomplished was raising the
jurisdictional standard to the level of a proof of violation under the Sher-
man Act.272
The original test provided a built-in limitation upon the exercise ofjuris-
diction by requiring intent.273 Curiously, some courts removed this limita-
tion for no apparent reason.274 In doing so, these courts allowed for an
interpretation of the "effects" test far more broad than could have occurred
under Judge Hand's formulation.275 Incidental effects could now implicate
Sherman Act jurisdiction.
While courts struggled to limit the "effects" test, some interpreted
"commerce" quite broadly. The original test concerned itself with intended
effects upon United States markets.276 Some cases have found jurisdiction
over disputes which affect American business operations in foreign mar-
kets.2 77 This is precisely what Judge Hand warned against in Alcoa, argu-
ing that Congress did not intend the Sherman Act to cover such
activities.278
In their current application, the various "effects" tests are in disarray.
The original test has been so liberally refined that its progeny is, amazingly,
269. See supra notes 89, 93, 99, 109, 115, 117, 125 and accompanying text.
270. United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am. ("Alcoa"), 148 F.2d 416, 443-44 (2d Cir. 1945).
271. See, e.g., Todhunter-Mitchell & Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 383 F. Supp. 586 (E.D.
Pa. 1974), aff'd mem., 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984), cert denied, 469 U.S. 835 (1984); United
States v. Watchmakers of Switzerland Info. Center, Inc., 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) f 70,600 at
77,414 (1962).
272. See supra notes 117, 119.
273. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444.
274. See, eg., Sabre Shipping Corp. v. American President Lines, Ltd., 285 F. Supp. 949
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
275. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443. See supra note 80 and accompanying text for the specific
language.
276. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 444-45.
277. Todhunter-Mitchell, 383 F. Supp. at 587; see supra note 125.
278. Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443-44.
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both overbroad and underinclusive.279 While these hybrid effects tests are
themselves failures, they nonetheless provide a framework for constructing
a proper effects test.
D. Re-Constructing the Effects Test
The original "effects" test was workable, though arguably too linguisti-
cally broad to survive the increasingly varied situations demanding resolu-
tion in today's multinational business community. Therefore, a new
"effects" formulation requires more specificity, but this must be accom-
plished with careful attention to proper language usage.
1. Modification of "Effects"
Courts were correct in sensing the need to modify "effects" because that
term left open a potentially overbroad interpretation. Sadly, those courts
which attempted such modification were not careful to choose proper lan-
guage to accomplish their purpose.280 However, a few courts have struck
upon a workable modifier in applying a standard of "anticompetitive ef-
fects."2 ' This term is useful in three ways: it can be incorporated as a
"term of art;" it has an economic meaning; and it will not be confused with
other Sherman Act standards.
"Anticompetitive effects" can be incorporated as a "term of art" to be
used in Sherman Act jurisdictional situations. The term clearly relates to
the nature of the effects rather than the extent of the effects. This is correct
since the extent of effects is properly analyzed within the Sherman Act vio-
lation context.282 Sherman Act jurisdiction properly rests with the exist-
ence of effects. "Anticompetitive effects" include those which restrain
competition, monopolize markets, fix prices or exclude new entrants into
markets.283 It is these activities which Congress sought to proscribe under
the Sherman Act, and therefore it is these activities into which courts
should inquire when determining jurisdiction.284
279. The tests are overbroad in the sense that some courts have asserted jurisdiction without
an intent requirement. Supra note 269. In addition, other courts have exercised jurisdiction when
there has been no established effect upon United States markets. Supra notes 270-71 and accom-
panying text.
280. See, ag., National Bank of Canada v. Interbank Card Ass'n, 666 F.2d 6, 8 (2d Cir.
1981); accord Bulk Oil (ZUG) A.G. v. Sun Co., 583 F. Supp. 1134, 1136 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd
mem, 742 F.2d 1431 (2d Cir. 1984).
281. See supra note 117.
282. These activities relate to the nature of conduct which the Sherman Act prohibits, as
opposed to gauging the extent of such conduct. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1982).
283. See supra notes 224, 226-29, 231 and accompanying text.
284. See supra note 231.
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Perhaps the best way to categorize an alleged effect as anticompetitive
would be to consider it in light of those protections Congress identified
under the Sherman Act.28 If the effect could injure United States markets,
consumers, businesses or the governmental regulatory power, it would be
classified as anticompetitive for Sherman Act jurisdictional purposes. This,
of course, should play no role at all in considering whether the conduct
actually violates the Act. It should only be addressed to consider whether
the Act applies to the alleged conduct.
2. Modification of "United States Commerce"
The current "effects" tests are subject to very broad interpretations in
terms of their "commerce" provision. Activity which affects "United States
commerce" has been held to be determinative of jurisdiction.286 Some
courts have exercised jurisdiction over activities which affected the "foreign
commerce" of the United States.28 7 This part of the test must be restruc-
tured in order to better adapt the test to the antitrust policy of the United
States. Commerce is a vague term, referring to virtually any activity within
economic bounds.2"' Terms such as "United States commerce" and "for-
eign commerce" can therefore refer to all economic activity to which the
United States, or a citizen or business, is a party.
In order to restrict Sherman Act coverage for jurisdictional purposes,
the word "commerce" should be replaced by the term "markets."2 9 This
285. Watchmakers of Switzerland, 1963 Trade Cas. (CCH) at 77,454.
286. Occidental Petroleum Corp. v. Buttes Gas & Oil Co., 331 F. Supp. 92, 102-03 (C.D. Cal.
1971), aff'd, 461 F.2d 1261 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 950 (1972).
287. The foremost goal of the antitrust laws is to protect the American economy. See, eg.,
Northern Pac. R.R. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958); M.C. Mfg. Co. v. Texas Foundries,
Inc., 517 F.2d 1059 (5th Cir. 1975); Pennsylvania Water & Power Co. v. Federal Power Comm'n,
193 F.2d 230 (D.C. Cir. 1951), aff'd, 343 U.S. 414 (1952).
288. Commerce includes: "The exchange of goods, productions, or property of any kind; the
buying, selling and exchanging of articles... [tirade, traffic, commerce, transportation or commu-
nication ...." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 244 (5th ed. 1979).
289. The following argument is based upon the viewpoint that the resolution of a particular
antitrust claim should be governed by the law of the nation where its effects are felt. This is not an
advocation of a return to the American Banana standard of territoriality, supra notes 17-21. Con-
duct which originates anywhere in the world may be subject to United States judicial authority, as
long as effects are alleged on American markets.
Conduct which affects American business, or American citizens, but does not affect American
markets, should be per se beyond the reach of the Sherman Act. This view of extraterritoriality
looks to the ability of American courts to assert control over the acts of individuals, wherever they
may occur, which impact American markets. It does not extend the power of American courts to
every dispute in which an American business alleges some injury. Thus, the Sherman Act can be
applied extraterritorily where alleged conduct affects Ameican markets.
Such judicial limitations are far more predictable than the various comity tests inherent in the
"balancing" inquiries. In addition, such limitations advocate a judicial consideration of effects
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would focus the court's inquiry upon the very economic entity which the
Sherman Act is designed to protect.290 Thus, the court would look to ef-
fects upon particular economic markets. Plaintiffs would have to allege
with particularity which markets are affected by the defendant's conduct.29 1
Such a requirement would not raise the level of factual allegation required
of the plaintiff, but would necessitate more specific allegations.2 92 The end
result of this verbal change would be to narrow the court's focus. The court
would simply determine whether plaintiffs have alleged anticompetitive ef-
fects within a defined market, rather than having to analyze whether a to-
tality of various alleged effects is sufficient to exercise jurisdiction.
3. Defining the Relevant Market for Sherman Act Purposes
The final modification of the "effects" test concerns to which markets
the Sherman Act should apply. Under the "effects on commerce" formula-
tion, courts were free to exercise jurisdiction when effects were alleged upon
an American corporation's ability to compete in foreign markets.2 93 Such
cases arguably fall outside of intended Sherman Act provisions. In order to
promote good will and greater predictability, the "effects" test should be
which does not force the courts into the realm of international law or politics. In truth, such
judicial limitiations may not be as helpful in situations where more than one nation has a valid
power to assert jurisdiction. See, e.g., Laker Airways, 731 F.2d 909.
290. See supra note 231. It is crucial at this point to delineate between a "market definition"
as is here advocated for jurisdictional purposes and a "market delineation" which is a part of the
plaintiff's Sherman Act proof requirements. See R. BLAIR & D. KASERMAN, ANTITRUST Eco-
NOMICS 106-10 (1985). The delineation of relevant markets in the Sherman Act proof of violation
phase allows the court to measure the impact of the plaintiff's claim on commercial activity. See,
e.g., Tampa Elec. Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 365 U.S. 320, 327 (1961).
In the jurisdictional phase, the advocation of the use of "markets" centers around an effort to
limit a court's review to effects in relevant Sherman Act areas. The use of the term "markets" in
this context should essentially be geographical. The Sherman Act is designed to protect American
products or other business markets. Hence, use of "markets" as a jurisdictional term is useful,
and should be applied only to the extent that it defines geographical markets into which the court
should, or should not, inquire in considering allegations of effects.
291. This would allow the court to focus its inquiry upon specific allegations relating to spe-
cific markets which the court could be confident that the Sherman Act was designed to cover.
This would also provide the court with a method of eliminating from its consideration allegations
relating to markets which the Act is not clearly designed to reach. Such a refinement would
foreclose a court from asserting jurisdiction based upon conduct alleged to affect foreign markets.
See, e.g., Todhunter-Mitchell, 383 F. Supp. 586.
292. The test is still grounded upon "anticompetitive effects," not upon "direct" or "substan-
tial" restraints (the violation standard). Plaintiffs would, however, have to demonstrate that such
alleged effects implicated American markets, as opposed to such entities as "American com-
merce" or "United States foreign commerce."
293. See Todhunter-Mitchell, 383 F. Supp. 586.
THE MALIGNED "EFFECTS" TEST
limited to domestic markets.2 9 4 When conduct affects foreign markets, the
United States' interest is lessened and the regulatory authority of the for-
eign nation is increased.295 Similarly, the antitrust goal of the United States
relating to protection of markets is at its lowest ebb.296 In addition, the
interests of American citizens are only indirectly impacted by conduct
which affects only foreign markets.297 Finally, the United States' interest in
protecting competitiveness between businesses is not strong because those
businesses have chosen to compete in foreign markets.298
4. The New "Effects" Test
Thus, courts should apply a test which inquires into the alleged "in-
tended anticompetitive effects upon United States markets." This test best
reflects the antitrust goals of the United States. Furthermore, the test is
based upon economic rather than political terms and better defines conduct
which the Sherman Act was designed to cover. Finally, the test is more
specific than current "effects" tests and does not allow for extensive judicial
interpretation as under the "balancing" tests. The test will provide greater
predictability for defendants, especially if applied uniformly throughout the
federal circuits.
VII. CONCLUSION
The current application of the Sherman Act jurisdictional provisions to
cases involving foreign defendants suffers from a lack of predictability and
uniformity because several tests have been formulated among the circuits.
Some courts have factored concerns of comity and international relations
into their jurisdictional tests. This response has moved courts into the
political and legislative sphere. Courts should not conduct political or legis-
lative balancing tests in construing economic provisions such as the Sher-
man Act. The "effects" tests provide a better analytical framework, but
current formulations are susceptible to a great deal of interpretation, which
renders unpredictable results.
294. The antitrust goals of the United States and the intended protections of the Sherman Act
are both at the apex of their influence when litigation centers around American markets. See
Kestenbaum, supra note 20, at 326.
295. See id.
296. See supra note 230.
297. In such a situation a plaintiff may opt for litigation in the foreign territory.
298. Part of the cost analysis a business conducts before entering foreign markets should
include an assessment of the relative competitive protections offered by the law of the host
country.
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The Supreme Court must address the wide disparity between the federal
circuits in the construction of Sherman Act jurisdictional provisions.299 In
creating a uniform test of subject matter jurisdiction, the Court should con-
sider the antitrust policy goals of the United States as well as the protec-
tions Congress sought to create under these laws. A test is needed which
reflects these concerns, keeps judicial interpretivism to a minimum, and
utilizes economic rather than legal terms. The "intended anticompetitive
United States market effects" test is such a standard. It is hoped that the
Supreme Court will announce such a test at the next opportunity.
EDWARD L. RHOLL
299. The Court recently passed upon such an opportunity in Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574 (1986). This issue, on appeal from the Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit, was whether the court of appeals had correctly evaluated the district court's grant
of summary judgment in favor of the foreign defendants. Id. at 582. Summary judgment was
granted not for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, but for failure to state a valid claim for relief.
Id. at 597-98.
The Court considered in detail Zenith's claim that the defendant's conduct violated the Sher-
man Act. Id. at 582-95. In the process, the Court cited Alcoa, 148 F.2d at 443, for the proposi-
tion that the Sherman Act does not act to "regulate the competitive conditions of other nation's
economies." Id. at 582; see supra notes 284, 286. The Court then posited that the Sherman Act
does "reach conduct outside our borders, but only when the conduct has an effect on American
commerce." Id. at 582 n.6 (citing as authority Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon
Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 704 (1962)); see supra note 220 and accompanying text. Thus, the Court
concluded its endorsement of the "effects" test in general, but did not reach the question of which
formulation of the test should be uniformly followed. In fairness to the Court, the issue of which
version of the "effects" test should be followed was not directly before it in Matsushita. It appears
that the Court is still unwilling to craft a uniform test of subject matter jurisdiction under the
Sherman Act until the issue is directly before it.
